HomeMy WebLinkAbout5-19-2026 Agenda Packet BOAPERSON COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT 325 S. Morgan Street, Suite B Roxboro, North Carolina 27573
PERSON COUNTY BOARD of ADUSTMENT
PERSON COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 215
May 19, 2026
7:00 P.M.
A.Call To Order / Determination of Quorum
B.Conflict of Interest polling of members
C.Regular Agenda
1.AP 01-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation – 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Tax Map & Parcel No. A105 15 2
2.AP 02-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order - 2510 Berry Pearce Rd, Tax Map &
Parcel No. A43 7
D.Minutes of March 17, 2026
E.Adjournment
PERSON COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT 325 S. Morgan Street,
Roxboro, North Carolina 27573
Case: AP 01-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation – 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Tax Map & Parcel No. 105 15 2
Background
Ms. Virginia Singleton and Ms. Janet Sowers have submitted an appeal of the Notice of Violation related to the use
of campers and recreational vehicles for storage and dwelling purposes without the required permits. The appeal
is based on hardship circumstances presented by the applicants. Planning staff continues to work with the
applicants to pursue compliance through issuance of a Temporary Hardship Permit pursuant to Planning Ordinance
Section 84-3 for a period of one year, as well as a permit for emergency use of a camper or recreational vehicle for
up to six months in accordance with Planning Ordinance Section 84-5.
Nature of Appeal:
Ms. Singleton and Ms. Sowers submitted a complete application and documents supporting their request. Notice
of Violation was issued April 8, 2026, identifying Planning Ordinance sections 60-7 and 60-8 being violated related
to the occupancy and storage use of campers and recreational vehicles without required permits. Applicant is
requesting reconsideration and a variance to the sections due to hardship.
Evidence Submitted:
Ms. Singleton and Ms. Sowers have submitted a complete application package in support of their appeal and
hardship request, including a written statement outlining the circumstances associated with the request and
supporting medical documentation for staff and Board consideration. Planning staff has also provided the Notice of
Violation, related correspondence, and documentation of ongoing communications with the applicants regarding
efforts to achieve compliance through the hardship and emergency-use permitting provisions of the Planning
Ordinance (Attachment 1 & 2). These materials are included for the Board’s consideration in evaluating the appeal
and the applicability of the hardship and emergency-use provisions of the Planning Ordinance.
Notice Requirements:
On May 7, 2026, signs were posted on the property’s right-of-way. Staff also mailed letters to property owners and
adjacent residents informing them of the public hearing in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes 160D-
406. Signs were later confirmed to have remained on the property the following day.
On May 14, 2026, in accordance with Planning Ordinance Section 160-2, staff published the legal ad for the appeal
to the local paper. Evidence of County meeting public notice requirements are in Attachment 3.
Staff Position:
Staff maintains that the Notice of Violation was properly issued pursuant to the Planning Ordinance; however, staff
continues to work with the applicants toward compliance options permitted under Sections 84-3 and 84-5.
Attachments:
1. Appeal
2. Notice of Violation and staff
3. Public Notices
Virginia D. Singleton
90 Wrenn Crumpton Road Roxboro, NC 27574
336-599-3515
Janet S. Sowers
289 Shady Hill Circle
Roxboro, NC 27573
336-504-0239
01netsingsow@embarqmail.com
04/17/2026
Gerisa Whyte
Person County Code Enforcement Administrator
Person County Planning and Zoning Department 325 South Morgan Street Roxboro, NC 27573
RE: Appeal of Code Violation Case #CE-26-1 0
90 Wrenn Crumpton Road
Roxboro, NC 27574
Dear Ms. Whyte,
We are writing to formally appeal the notice of code violation dated April 8, 2026,
regarding 90 Wrenn Crumpton, Roxboro, NC 27574. The notice alleges that I, Virginia
D.Singleton, as land owner, violated section 60-7 and 60-8, regarding storage of
campers and recreational vehicles and ownership of property and camper/recreational
vehicle, in addition to the camper/recreational vehicle being used as a dwelling.
We, Virginia D. Singleton, and Janet S. Sowers, are asking for reconsideration and for a
variance of the code due to my, Virginia D, Singleton, age of 97 years and my
considerable medical issues and the undue burden and hardship strict adherence to the
codes would cause. We are asking for the variance because we rely on the care and
monitoring that Nicco Saur, our grandson and son respectively, and girlfriend, Jessica
Kimball, provide, in addition to the care I, Janet S. Sowers, provide and have provided
for the past 2.5 years.
Attachment 1
Person County
Planning and Zoning Department
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Apr 08, 2026 CASE #CE-26-10
SINGLETON VIRGINIA D
90 WRENN CRUMPTON RD
ROXBORO, NC 27574-7762
To the Responsible Party:
Staff of the Person County Planning and Zoning Department conducted a site visit to your property located at 90
WRENN CRUMPTON RD, Roxboro, NC, 27574 Parcel ID 9995-00-21-7741.000 determined that the property
is in violation of the Person County Ordinance ARTICLE VI SECTION 60 - GENERAL REGULATIONS.
60-7 Campers and Recreational Vehicles shall not be used for dwelling purposes on individual lots but can be
stored provided they are registered to the owner of the lot and there is an existing dwelling. There shall only be
one camper/recreational vehicle stored per lot. A Special Use Permit will be required for storage of more than
one camper/recreational vehicle and property owner and camper/recreational vehicle owner must be the same.
60-8 Use of one camper/recreational vehicle shall be permitted as an accessory dwelling on an improved lot or
on an unimproved lot or tract for a period not to exceed two continuous weeks. A four week interval shall be
required between each allowed use. A tract of land owned by a single owner may not be subdivided into multiple
lots for the purpose of evading this section.
To comply with the provisions of the Ordinance you are required to immediately cease using the camper as a
dwelling for occupancy. The property must be in compliance with the provision of the Ordinance by a date no
later than: 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE. Failure to comply with this notice will result in a civil
penalty in the amount of Fifty dollars ($50.00) for each day the violation continues . Each day constitutes a
separate and distinct offense.
You may appeal within ten (10) days from the date of this notice. The request for an appeal must be in writing to
the County Planning Department and to the clerk, the order of the Planning Director is final. Should you have
any questions please call (336) 553-9696 ext. 410.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Gerisa Whyte
Person County Code Enforcement Administrator
5/8/26, 12:23 PM Document
https://agency.comcate.com/agencies/639/products/cases/965020 1/2
Attachment 2
Photos:
Photo Details
Date: Apr 07, 2026 14:44
Date: Apr 07, 2026 14:44
5/8/26, 12:23 PM Document
https://agency.comcate.com/agencies/639/products/cases/965020 2/2
PERSON COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT
325 S. Morgan Street Suite B
Roxboro, North Carolina 27573
May 5, 2026
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
The Person County Board of Adjustment will hold a public hearing on Tuesday, May 19, 2026, at
7:00 p.m. in the Person County Office Building, Room 215, at 304 S. Morgan St., Roxboro, NC
to hear the following:
•AP 01-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation – 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Tax Map & Parcel
No. A105 15 2
•AP 02-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order - 2510 Berry Pearce Rd,
Tax Map & Parcel No. A43 7
The public is invited to attend and comment on the request. Any person wishing to speak must be
present at the scheduled time and will be required to swear or affirm their testimony, as this is a
quasi-judicial hearing. For further information on the case(s) listed above, please contact the
Person County Planning and Zoning Department at (336) 597-1750.
Person County Planning & Zoning Dept., 325 S. Morgan St. Suite B, Roxboro, NC 27573.
Mailed Notice:
• 2279 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC• 202 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC• 2221 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 2150 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 54 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 2242 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 2119 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC• 161 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC• 145 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 2251 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 118 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 168 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 2176 Burlington Rd, Roxboro, NC• 2202 Burlington Rd, Durham, NC
Attachment 3
Date Total Postage
Pieces
Total
Charged
Mode
May 7, 2026 28 $20.72 $0.00 $20.72 ManualWeightEntry Normal
Planning zone
11:31:40
AM
11:32:28
AM
0:00:00:48 1st Class Regular Letter $0.00
Account Transaction Log
Total Time
(Days:HH:MM:SS)
Class of Mail Surcharge
Amount
Date Range: May 1, 2026 to May 8, 2026 Account Transaction Log Report
Meter Group: All Meters 2 meter(s) did not upload before ending date
You have 6 meters in the selected group
PERSON COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT 325 S. Morgan Street, Roxboro, North Carolina 27573
Case: AP 02-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order - 2510 Berry Pearce Rd, Tax Map & Parcel No.
A43 7
Background
Ms. Angela Battle has submitted an appeal to the Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order issued in connection
with the operation of an Event Center without the required Special Use Permit. Prior to issuance of the current
enforcement action, Planning staff made extensive efforts to assist Ms. Battle in achieving compliance, including
coordination related to a potential Special Use Permit application following a previous Notice of Violation issued on
November 14, 2025. Despite these efforts, the record reflects continued and repeat violations of the Person County
Planning Ordinance related to Event Center activities on the property.
The Person County Planning Ordinance, as amended on September 9, 2019, defines an Event Center as:
A commercial establishment and associated grounds engaged in the hosting and production of pre-planned events
like weddings, corporate parties, or reunions. Typical accessory uses include kitchens or meal preparation space,
limited overnight accommodations, photography studios, facilities to accommodate live or recorded music, on- and
off-site parking and outdoor recreation facilities.
Additionally, nearby residents have continued to express concerns regarding recurring large college parties
occurring on the property. These events have generated repeated complaints related to noise, traffic, and public
safety and have required intervention by the Person County Sheriff’s Office to disperse gatherings. Staff finds that
the continued occurrence of such events presents ongoing concerns related to the public health, safety, and welfare
of the surrounding community.
Nature of Appeal:
Ms. Battle asserts that the subject property qualifies for exemption from local regulation under the State’s Bona
Fide Farm provisions, with reliance on agritourism. Specifically, she contends that the non-farm or agriculture
related activities occurring on the property, by college students, constitute protected agritourism activities
incidental to a bona fide farm operation and therefore fall outside the County authority (Attachment 1).
Notice Requirements:
On May 7, 2026, signs were posted on the property’s right-of-way. Staff also mailed letters to property owners and
adjacent residents informing them of the public hearing in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes 160D-
406. Signs were later confirmed to have remained on the property the following day.
On May 14, 2026, in accordance with Planning Ordinance Section 160-2, staff published the legal ad for the appeal
to the local paper. Evidence of County meeting public notice requirements are in Attachment 2.
Evidence Submitted:
Staff’s review of the record indicates that the Notices of Violation, Agritourism Determination, and related
correspondence consistently identified the unauthorized use as the operation of a commercial Event Center without
the required zoning approval. The record further demonstrates that Ms. Battle was provided with multiple
opportunities to pursue compliance through the Special Use Permit process and to exercise her appeal rights in
accordance with applicable local and state regulations.
In support of the County’s position, staff has submitted a detailed report and supporting evidence documenting
repeated violations associated with the property dating back to the “Oil Spill” incident occurring on October 22,
2025. The record reflects that the property was previously marketed and operated as an event venue known as
“Field of Dreams,” as documented through local media coverage, and has more recently been rebranded as “Pond
Haven.”
Further evidence submitted by staff includes event-related contracts and promotional materials indicating the
accommodation of large gatherings involving increased traffic, on-site parking, amplified noise, and the presence
and consumption of alcohol at events conducted on the property. The record also includes correspondence from
college students attempting to characterize fraternity gatherings and similar social events as agritourism activities.
Staff finds that such descriptions are inconsistent with the ordinary and statutory understanding of bona fide
agritourism activities and instead reflect organized social gatherings involving college-aged attendees, including
concerns associated with underage alcohol access and related public safety impacts.
Staff Position:
Staff maintains that the Notice of Violation, Stop Work Order, and Written Agritourism Determination were properly
issued in accordance with the Person County Planning Ordinance and applicable North Carolina General Statutes.
Based on the evidence contained in the record, including videos, staff requests that the Board of Adjustment uphold
the enforcement actions and determinations in full (Attachment 3).
Legal Memorandum:
The Planning Department is represented by County Attorney T.C. Morphis of Brough Law Firm, PLLC. Counsel has
provided a legal memorandum and supporting analysis for the Board of Adjustment’s consideration in evaluating
the facts, applicable provisions of the Person County Planning Ordinance, and relevant North Carolina General
Statutes governing zoning enforcement, agritourism exemptions, and quasi-judicial appeals.
The legal analysis is intended to assist the Board in determining whether the Notice of Violation, Stop Work Order,
and Agritourism Determination were lawfully issued, supported by competent and substantial evidence in the
record, and consistent with the County’s regulatory authority under Chapter 160D of the North Carolina General
Statutes (Attachment 4).
Attachments:
1.Appeal
2.Public Notices
3.Staff Report
4.Memorandum of Law Re: 2510 Berry Pearce Road
Page 1 of 3
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
1. I received a Final Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order dated April 16
th 2026 alleging that activities
on my property do not qualify as “bona fide farm purposes” or permissible agritourism under North
Carolina law and county regulations.
2. My property has been formally recognized as qualifying for bona fide farm status, as evidenced by:
o A forest management plan; and
o Inclusion in the Present-Use Value (PUV) tax program.
3. I provided documentation to the Planning Director demonstrating that my use of the property falls
within agritourism activities associated with bona fide farming. Over 90% of my property is used for
forestry or agriculture.
4. The County’s own Agritourism Determination acknowledges that the property qualifies for bona fide
farm status but asserts—without sufficient factual support—that certain uses constitute a nonfarm “event
center.”
5. As further evidence of agritourism use, I submitted pictures that highlighted the farm’s agritourism
aspects and a written request from a prospective customer describing the property’s available passive
recreational and nature-based activities, that include:
o Enjoyment of a woodland and pond setting
o Bird observation
o Catch-and-release fishing
o An outdoor gathering space consistent with rural farm use configurable for seating and/or other
structures using hay bales from the farm’s hay operation
6. On April 24, 2026, I requested clarification from the Planning Director regarding the specific nature of
the alleged violations. No response was provided.
7. On or about April 24, 2026, the Planning Director met with the Person County Sheriff and requested
preemptive enforcement actions against activities on my property.
BEFORE THE PERSON COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
APPEAL OF NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND STOP WORK ORDER
Appellant: Angela Battle
Property Address: 2510 Berry-Pearce Rd, Timberlake NC
Date of Appeal: May 4th 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
I, Angela Battle, hereby file this appeal of the “Final Notice of Violation and Notice of Stop Work Order”
issued by Planning Director Nishith Trevidi on April 16, 2026, pursuant to applicable provisions of North
Carolina law and Person County ordinances. This appeal is timely filed within the 30-day period provided in the
notice. It is noted that this appeal, during its duration, stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed
from.
Attachment 1
Page 2 of 3
III. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
A. The Property Qualifies for Bona Fide Farm Use
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160D-903, property used for bona fide farm purposes is exempt from county zoning
regulations. The County has already acknowledged that my property meets this standard.
The activities conducted on the property are directly related to and supportive of the farm’s rural character and
use, and therefore fall within the scope of permitted agritourism.
B. Agritourism Activities Are Mischaracterized
The County’s characterization of my property as an “event center” is inaccurate and unsupported. The described
activities are incidental, low-impact, and consistent with agritourism, including nature observation and passive
outdoor recreation.
These uses are commonly recognized components of agritourism operations and do not constitute a separate
commercial use outside the farm exemption.
C. Failure to Provide Statutorily Required Specificity
The Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order fails to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160D-404, which requires
that such notices clearly state:
• The specific violations; and
• The specific actions required to achieve compliance.
The notice does not identify:
• What specific activities must cease;
• What specific ordinance provisions are being violated; or
• What corrective actions are required.
This lack of specificity renders the notice legally deficient.
D. Violation of Due Process Rights
Because the notice lacks clarity and specificity, I have been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to:
• Understand the alleged violation;
• Take corrective action; or
Page 3 of 3
• Prepare an informed defense.
This constitutes a violation of fundamental due process protections under North Carolina law.
E. Procedural and Enforcement Concerns
The Planning Director’s failure to respond to a request for clarification, combined with coordination of
preemptive enforcement actions through the Sheriff, raises serious concerns regarding:
• Fair and impartial enforcement;
• Ethics and Civil Rights violations
• Premature or extrajudicial action prior to resolution of this appeal; and
• Interference with lawful agritourism operations.
IV. RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully request that the Board of Adjustment:
1. Reverse and rescind the Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order in its entirety;
2. Affirm that the use of the property qualifies as bona fide farm use and permissible agritourism under
North Carolina law;
3. Find that the notice issued fails to meet statutory requirements; and
4. Grant any other relief the Board deems just and appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence demonstrates that my property is lawfully operating as a bona fide farm with associated
agritourism activities. The enforcement action taken is unsupported by sufficient facts, procedurally deficient,
and inconsistent with North Carolina statutory protections.
Respectfully submitted,
Angela Battle
Email: angela.j.battle@gmail.com Tel: 919 884 7667
Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
1 message
Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 12:12 PM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>
Cc: "B. Michie Brandon" <bmbrandon@personcountync.gov>, "gerisa@scei.us" <gerisa@scei.us>
HI Nish,
As previously requested, please provide an explanation of how the property is being used
outside of the agritourism statute and is being used for a "non-farm" purpose. This needs
clarification. What is the basis/evidence for this statement? Again, N.C. Gen. Statute § 160D-
903(a) establishes that property used for "bona fide farm purposes" is exempt from county zoning
regulations. I would kindly request that you send me this explanation by the 28th of April 2026, I
need this information to properly address the questions and appeals documents the county is
sending me. I am within my rights to have this information, and this email serves as a formal
record of my request to ensure proper due process in this matter.
If there is no factual basis for this "non-farm" claim, I would ask that you close this case.
Kind Regards,
Angela Battle
On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 11:47 AM Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov> wrote:
The Notice of Determination was included with your Notice of Violation, see attached.
Nish
From: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2026 11:43 AM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>
Cc: B. Michie Brandon <bmbrandon@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us <gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please verify the sender's email address
carefully before clicking links or opening attachments
Please report suspicious emails to Person County IT.
Nish,
I am happy to provide you with more information on the Pond Haven agritourism operation.
However, it appears that your department does not have much experience in contract law and
the agritourism area. In the Notice of Violation letter that was sent to me, the last sentence
reads "The ongoing use of the Subject Property as an event center is a nonfarm purpose and
thus is subject to County zoning regulations".
I would formally like to request a Written Zoning Determination from the county planning
department explaining why the department believes the activites on my property do not meet
the legal definition of agritourism. Without this clarification, I am unable to answer any more
questions or determine if I am actually required to fill out the requested appeals documents given
5/4/26, 11:05 AM Gmail - Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=2febaf12fe&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f:1863367423450303293%7Cmsg-a:r672926739941126070&simpl=msg-a:…1/3
that N.C. Gen. Statute § 160D-903(a) establishes that property used for "bona fide farm
purposes" is exempt from county zoning regulations. I would kindly request that this Written
Zoning Determintion be sent to me by the 28th of April 2026. This email serves as a formal
record of my request to ensure proper due process in this matter.
I will CC Michie Brandon, who has also begun to send me emails .
Kind Regards,
Angela Battle
On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 10:39 AM Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov> wrote:
As property owner, who enforces the Alcohol and Noise provisions of your contract?
Nish
From: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2026 10:36 AM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us <gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please verify the sender's email address
carefully before clicking links or opening attachments
Please report suspicious emails to Person County IT.
Please see attached.
On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 9:31 AM Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov> wrote:
Ms. Battle,
Kindly provide us a copy of your standard Contract for these Events, college Fraternity and others.
Thank you.
Nish
From: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2026 6:11 PM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us <gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please verify the sender's email
address carefully before clicking links or opening attachments
Please report suspicious emails to Person County IT.
Dear Nish,
I received your letter in regards to my agritourism operation in Person County. Thank-you for acknowledging that I have all the
necessary prerequisites (Forestry plan, PUV enrollment, signage displays, etc.) for my newly established agritourism site, which
definitively certifies my property is being used for "bona fide farm purposes". The N.C. Gen. Statute § 160D-903(a) establishes
5/4/26, 11:05 AM Gmail - Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=2febaf12fe&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f:1863367423450303293%7Cmsg-a:r672926739941126070&simpl=msg-a:…2/3
that property used for "bona fide farm purposes" is exempt from county zoning regulations. Accordingly, because the statute
explicitly includes agritourism as a qualifying bona fide farm purpose, an Event Center Special Use Permit need not be
acquired.
The activities that take place on my property most definitely fall within the operational/permissible scope defined by the term
agritourism (DEFINITION: "agritourism means any activity carried out on a farm or ranch that allows members of
the general public, for recreational, entertainment or educational purposes, to view or enjoy activities including farming,
ranching, historic, cultural, harvest-your-own - activities hunting, fishing, equestrian activities, or natural activities and
attractions. A building or structure used for agritourism includes any building or structure used for public or private
events, including but not limited to weddings, receptions, meetings, demonstrations of farm activities, meals, and other
events that are taking place on the farm because of its farm or rural setting.") Please note that having a public or private
"event" on a property does not make the property an "Event Center". Also note that more than 90% of my property is used for
farming and forestry.
I am a member of the NC Agritourism Network Association, where there are numerous organizations with profiles similar to mine
( https://nc-ana.org/about/our-bona-fide-farm-members#!directory/map); studying this information may be helpful to your
department in gaining an understanding of currently occuring agritourism activities permissable under the N.C. Gen. Statute §
160D-903(a).
It appears your officers could not access the gated area of my property to examine and photograph the relevant agritourism
elements, so I have provided more images (see attached).The farm's hay production and storage operation provides my clients
with composite material to design and assemble some of their event structures. The campfire pit is fueled with wood from the
forest. The area also has a wildlife certification and is a bird sanctuary. If your officers need to access this area for inspection
purposes please contact me for entry instructions.
I have attached a recent email requesting use of the property for a private event, which clearly states the agritourism related
activities that would take place there. Given your inquiry, I will require all future customers to send me a similar letter detailing
how they plan to use the property.
I hope this response addresses all your concerns and clarifies that my property is not in violation of any Person County
planning ordinances and no corrections are necessary. Please contact me via email in a reasoable time before the end of the
30 day appeals period if more information is required.
Kind Regards,
Angela Battle
5/4/26, 11:05 AM Gmail - Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Re: EXTERNAL: Case #CE-26-13 / Notice of Violation
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=2febaf12fe&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f:1863367423450303293%7Cmsg-a:r672926739941126070&simpl=msg-a:…3/3
From: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2026 7:49 AM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>
Cc: B. Michie Brandon <bmbrandon@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us
<gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Angela Battle - Submission of Appeal to Notice of Violation and Stop
Work Order
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please verify the sender's
email address carefully before clicking links or opening attachments
Please report suspicious emails to Person County IT.
Nish,
Please see the attachment. Let me know the procedure for paying the appeals fee.
Kind Regards,
Angela Battle
From: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2026 8:45 AM
To: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Cc: B. Michie Brandon <bmbrandon@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us
<gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: Re: EXTERNAL: Angela Battle - Submission of Appeal to Notice of Violation and
Stop Work Order
Ms. Battle,
Please submit the application provided to you by Michie along with the fee and we will have
you scheduled for the Board of Adjustment, Tuesday, May 19th meeting.
Thank you.
Nish
From: Angela Battle <angela.j.battle@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2026 7:49 AM
To: Nishith Trivedi <ntrivedi@personcountync.gov>
Cc: B. Michie Brandon <bmbrandon@personcountync.gov>; gerisa@scei.us
<gerisa@scei.us>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Angela Battle - Submission of Appeal to Notice of Violation and Stop
Work Order
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Please verify the sender's
email address carefully before clicking links or opening attachments
Please report suspicious emails to Person County IT.
Nish,
Please see the attachment. Let me know the procedure for paying the appeals fee.
Kind Regards,
Angela Battle
PERSON COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT
325 S. Morgan Street Suite B
Roxboro, North Carolina 27573
May 5, 2026
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
The Person County Board of Adjustment will hold a public hearing on Tuesday, May 19, 2026, at
7:00 p.m. in the Person County Office Building, Room 215, at 304 S. Morgan St., Roxboro, NC
to hear the following:
•AP 01-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation – 90 Wrenn Crumpton Rd, Tax Map & Parcel
No. A105 15 2
•AP 02-26 – Appeal of Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order - 2510 Berry Pearce Rd,
Tax Map & Parcel No. A43 7
The public is invited to attend and comment on the request. Any person wishing to speak must be
present at the scheduled time and will be required to swear or affirm their testimony, as this is a
quasi-judicial hearing. For further information on the case(s) listed above, please contact the
Person County Planning and Zoning Department at (336) 597-1750.
Person County Planning & Zoning Dept., 325 S. Morgan St. Suite B, Roxboro, NC 27573.
Mailed Notice:• 2344 Guess Rd, Timberlake, NC
• 2974 Catherine Way, Sophia, NC
• 105 Willie Gray Rd, Timberlake, NC
• 2857 Berry Pearce Rd, Timberlake, NC
• 2112 Crestwood Ridge Dr, Durham, NC
• 1823 Satterfield Rd, Hurdle Mills, NC• 3217 Coachmans Way, Durham, NC• 7709 Amesbury Dr, Chapel Hill, NC
• 148 Hickson Rd, Roxboro, NC
• 105 Willie Gray Rd, Timberlake, NC
• 2857 Berry Pearce Rd, Timberlake, NC
• 346 E Lakewood Ave Apt 103, Durham, NC
• Po Box 27121, Raleigh, NC• 2955 Berry Pearce Rd, Timberlake, NC• 226 Jack Chavis Rd, Timberlake, NC
Attachment 2
Date Total Postage
Pieces
Total
Charged
Mode
May 7, 2026 28 $20.72 $0.00 $20.72 ManualWeightEntry Normal
Planning zone
11:31:40
AM
11:32:28
AM
0:00:00:48 1st Class Regular Letter $0.00
Account Transaction Log
Total Time
(Days:HH:MM:SS)
Class of Mail Surcharge
Amount
Date Range: May 1, 2026 to May 8, 2026 Account Transaction Log Report
Meter Group: All Meters 2 meter(s) did not upload before ending date
You have 6 meters in the selected group
Person County
Planning and Zoning Department
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Nov 14, 2025 CASE #CE-25-15
THE JOSEPH REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
3217 COACHMANS WAY
Durham, NC 27705-6035
To the Responsible Party:
Staff of the Person County Planning and Zoning Department conducted a site visit to your property located at
2510 Berry -Pearce Road, Timberlake, NC, 27583 Parcel ID 9990-01-27-0847.000 determined that the property
is in violation of the Person County Ordinance.
ARTICLE XVI APPENDIX C TABLE OF PERMITTED USES: Event Center.
To comply with the provisions of the Ordinance please contact the Person County Planning department for
further instructions.
The property will be reinspection for compliance December 14, 2025.
You may appeal within ten (10) days from the date of this notice. The request for an appeal must be in writing to
the County Planning Department and to the clerk, the order of the Planning Director is final. Should you have
any questions please call (336) 553-9696 ext. 410.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Gerisa Whyte
Person County Code Enforcement Administrator
Attachment 3
Photos:
Photo Details
Date: Nov 05, 2025 13:05
Date: Nov 05, 2025 13:05
Date: Nov 05, 2025 13:05
Person County
Planning and Zoning Department
FINAL NOTICE OF VIOLATION
NOTICE OF STOP WORK ORDER
April 16, 2026 CASE #CE-26-13
Via First Class Mail and Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
THE JOSEPH REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
346 E. Lakewood Ave.
Apt. 103
Durham, NC 27707-1874
And
3217 COACHMANS WAY
Durham, NC 27705-6035
To the Responsible Party:
By letter dated November 14, 2025, the Person County Planning and Zoning Department issued a notice of
violation for the Property located at 2510 BERRY PEARCE RD, Flat River, NC, 27583 Parcel ID 9990-01-27-
0847.000 (Tax Map & Parcel No. A43 7). By that letter, you were notified that the Property was in violation of the
Person County Planning Ordinance for operating an event center without a special use permit.
Subsequent investigation indicates that the property continues to be utilized for private events following issuance
of the prior November 14, 2025 Notice of Violation. These activities do not meet the definitions or permissible
scope of bona fide farming and/or agritourism uses under the State and County regulations. For that reason, the
event center use remains subject to the zoning authority of Person County and may only be conducted on the
property with a special use permit.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160D-404(b), you are hereby directed to stop all event center activities on the property
until such time as a special use permit has been lawfully obtained.
In addition to this final notice, the enclosed Notice of Determination is being issued to formally clarify the
applicable regulatory interpretation. In accordance with County regulations, civil penalties will be assessed if the
violation is not corrected within thirty (30) days of this notice.
To comply with the provisions of the Ordinance please contact the Person County Planning Department for further
instructions.
The property will be reinspected for compliance 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE.
Attachment 12
You may appeal this Notice of Violation and/or the Notice of Determination to the Person County Board of
Adjustment within thirty (30) days from the date of this notice. The request for an appeal must be in writing to the
County Planning Director Mr. Nish Trivedi. A written appeal may be submitted to Mr. Trivedi by email at
ntrivedi@personcountync.gov. Should you have any questions please call (336) 553-9696 ext. 410.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Gerisa Whyte
Person County Code Enforcement Administrator
CC: T.C. Morphis, Jr., County Attorney (via email to morphis@broughlawfirm.com)
Mr. Floyd McKissick (via email to floyd@mckissicklaw.com)
Photos:
Photo Details
Date: Apr 09, 2026 15:21
Date: Apr 09, 2026 15:21
PERSON COUNTY’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE: 2510 BERRY PEARCE ROAD
Statement of Facts
Ms. Angela Battle operates her business at 2510 Berry Pearce Road, Person County (the
“Subject Property”). The Subject Property is zoned “Residential District” and is located in the
Timberlake community.
In October, 2025, County staff became aware of a party of up to 5,000 college-age
individuals at the Subject Property. The party was reportedly connected to homecoming at NC
Central University, although the University did not sanction the event. During the course of the
party, the County received nearly two dozen 911 calls. A vehicle crash injured 4 attendees.
County staff issued Notices of Violation on November 7 and 14, 2025. The NOVs directed
Ms. Battle to stop any “event center” activities on the Subject Property until she obtained a Special
Use Permit. In January, 2026, Ms. Battle communicated her intent and desire to continue using the
Subject Property to host events without obtaining a Special Use Permit. Specifically, Ms. Battle
argued that no Special Use Permit is required because the Subject Property is exempt from County
ordinances as a bona fide farm.
In early April, 2026, County staff received complaints of ongoing parties hosted on the
Subject Property, including the use of buses to transport college students to the Subject Property.
On April 16, 2026, County staff issued another NOV and a written determination to Ms. Battle
stating that the use of the Subject Property as an event center does not qualify for bona fide farm
protections. Ms. Battle appeals to this Board.
Applicable Law
Person County regulates property use across the County in accordance with its Planning
Ordinance.1 The Planning Ordinance designates an “Event Center” use classification, and that use
is permitted only in a Residential District with a Special Use Permit.2 An Event Center is defined
as, “[a] commercial establishment and associated grounds engaged in the hosting and production
of pre-planned events like weddings, corporate parties, or reunions. Typical accessory uses include
kitchens or meal preparation space, limited overnight accommodations, photography studios,
facilities to accommodate live or recorded music, on- and off-site parking and outdoor recreation
facilities.”3
1 Planning Ordinance, Article I, Section 12
2 Planning Ordinance, Article VII, Section 72 3 Planning Ordinance, Article VII, Section 71
Attachment 4
2
Under state law, “County zoning regulations may not affect property used for bona fide farm
purposes,” but County zoning still applies to “the use of farm property for nonfarm purposes.”4
The applicability of this exemption is determined by applying a two-part test:
- First, the property must qualify as a bona fide farm, and
- Second, the activity at hand must be a “bona fide farm purpose” (as opposed to a non-farm
purpose).5
Under the second part of this test, “[j]ust because an activity occurs on a farm does not mean it
counts as a farm activity.”6 Instead, state statutes and caselaw have developed a “complex array of
what activities count as a bona fide farm purpose,” and “careful consideration and analysis is
necessary to make a determination.”7
Part One: Whether a Property Qualifies as a Farm.
Under the first part of the test, a property is presumed to be a bona fide farm if one of the
following four circumstances is shown:
1. A farm sales tax exemption certificate from the Department of Revenue,
2. A tax listing showing that the property is eligible for the present-use value program,
3. A Schedule F form from the IRS, or
4. A forest management plan.
Part Two: Whether the Activity is a Bona Fide Farm Purpose.
The second part of the test requires a case-by-case factual analysis to determine if a specific
activity is a bona fide farm purpose. Sometimes, the analysis is simple: planting and harvesting
crops or timber, raising livestock, and operating a grain warehouse are all certainly bona fide farm
purposes. Likewise, operating a car wash, a hotel, or an industrial factory are all clearly non-farm
purposes. Some activities are a closer call. For example, the North Carolina courts have determined
that breeding and kenneling dogs is not a bona fide farm purpose; that using crop and livestock
byproducts to mass-produce biodiesel is not a bona fide farm operation; and that occasional
firearms target practice is a bona fide farm purpose, but commercial firearms training is not.
“Agritourism” is considered a bona fide farm purpose under state statute.8 and is defined
as:
any activity carried out on a farm or ranch that allows members of the general
public, for recreation, entertainment, or educational purposes, to view or enjoy rural
4 N.C.G.S. § 160D‑903(a). 5 Adam Lovelady, Bona Fide Farms and Development Regulations, 37 Planning and Zoning Law Bulletin p 4 (May
2026). 6 Id. at p 2.
7 Id. 8 G.S. § 160D-903(a).
3
activities, including farming, ranching, historic, cultural, harvest-your-own
activities, hunting, fishing, equestrian activities, or natural activities and
attractions.9
Broken down into its elements, agritourism is: (1) any activity on a farm or ranch, that (2) allows
members of the general public, (3) for recreation, entertainment, or educational purposes, (4) to
view or enjoy rural activities like farming, ranching, historic, cultural, harvest-your-own activities,
hunting, fishing, equestrian activities, or natural activities and attractions.
In the case of Jeffries v. County of Harnett, the Court of Appeals determined that an outdoor
shooting range was not agritourism and instead was a nonfarm purpose. The Court reasoned that
even though the shooting range required space that only a rural setting can provide, shooting itself
is not purposefully performed on a farm for the aesthetic value of the farm or its rural setting. In
other words, that farm or rural aesthetic was merely incidental to the true purpose of the shooting
activity.
Certain activities that are not specifically named in the above interpretation but that likely
count as “agritourism” include:
- corn mazes, as recreation and entertainment for which the public enjoys agricultural
attractions;
- wine tasting at a vineyard, for entertainment and educational purposes involving the public
consumption of natural items; and
- tractor rides around a farm, as rural activity subject to inherent risks of equipment
ordinarily used in a farm operation.
Applying the above test, each of these activities, (1) occurs on a farm or ranch, is (2) open to
members of the general public, is for (3) recreation, entertainment, or educational purposes, and is
to (4) view or enjoy rural activities like farming, ranching, historic, cultural, harvest-your-own
activities, hunting, fishing, equestrian activities, or natural activities and attractions. And, in accord
with the Jeffries case, the farm or rural aesthetic is not merely incidental to the true purpose of
these activities. Instead, corn mazes, wine tastings, and tractor rides each intrinsically require a
farm or rural setting.
Legal Analysis
Applying the bona fide farm and agritourism exemptions to this case, the two-part test
shows that Ms. Battle’s recurring use of 2510 Berry Pearce Road to host college parties is not a
bona fide farm purpose that is exempt from County zoning. Because the use is subject to County
zoning and is best classified as an “event center,” it requires special use permit.
9 Id.
4
Under part one of the test, Ms. Battle has offered evidence that creates a presumption that
the Subject Property is a bona fide farm. Specifically, she has provided a forest management plan
and demonstrated qualification for participation in the Present-Use Value tax program. Although
this evidence creates the presumption that the Subject Property has bona fide farm status, G.S. §
160D-903(a) makes it clear that this status does not exempt all activities occurring on the property
from County zoning.
Under part two of the test, the evidence clearly demonstrates that hosting college
parties is not “agritourism.” The college parties are not agritourism because, while they occur on
a farm or ranch, they do not allow members of the general public to participate. Rather, they are
often limited to students and friends of a panhellenic organization or a university at large.
Moreover, although the activities are for recreational and entertainment purposes, their primary
purpose is not to view or enjoy rural activities. Instead, these parties could be held anywhere, but
upon information and belief, they are being held in the rural Timberlake community solely as a
way to move them away from more densely populated areas, such as within the City of Durham,
where their size and noise would never be tolerated. As in Jeffries, the use at issue might need the
land that is only available in a rural area, but the use itself is not being purposefully performed on
a farm for the aesthetic value of the farm or its rural setting. Instead, that farm or rural aesthetic is
merely incidental to the true purpose of the partying. Unlike corn mazes or pick-your-own produce
attractions, a party venue does not intrinsically require a farm to operate.
Conclusion
The bona fide farm test requires two parts before a use is exempted from county zoning.
Under the first part, Ms. Battle has sufficiently created the presumption that the Subject Property
is a bona fide farm. Under the second part, college parties are a nonfarm purpose, regardless of
where they are held. As a result, a party venue that hosts college parties is not and cannot be exempt
from County zoning, and a Special Use Permit will be required.
THE BROUGH LAW FIRM
s/ T.C. Morphis
T.C. Morphis
Attorney for County staff
79
Section 72 – Table of Permitted Uses
(Amended: 5/18/92; 11/17/92; 4/4/94; 7/11/94; 2/19/96; 6/3/96; 7/8/96; 5/5/97; 12/6/99; 5/4/2001; 12/1/2003;
6/6/2005; 11/1/2004; 11/19/2007; 11/3/2008; 12/1/2008; 4/20/2015; 9/6/2016; 10/2/17; 10/5/20, 11/16/20; 5/3/21,
8/4/25, 11/3/25, 11/18/25)
Districts in which particular uses are permitted as a Use-By-Right are indicated by "X". Districts in which
particular uses are permitted as a Use-By-Right with certain conditions are indicated by "X" with a reference
to a footnote to this Table.
District in which particular uses are permitted as a special use upon approval of the Board of Commissioners
are indicated by "S". See Section 153 for details in obtaining a Special Use Permit.
PRINCIPAL USES ZONING DISTRICTS
R B-2 B-1 GI RC
Accessory Building X X X X X
Accessory Uses Incidental to Any Permitted Use X X X X
AGRICULTURAL OR FARM USE EXEMPT FROM PLANNING ORDINANCE
Aircraft Equipment, Parts and Supplies X X X
Airport Operations S S S X S
Airstrips, (Private) /Heliport Without Commercial Activity
(Added 5/7/01)
X X X X X
Ambulance Service or Rescue Service S X X S X
Amusement Parks S X
Animal Medical Care (Including Kennel Operations)X X X
Auction X X X
Automobile Off-Street Parking, (Commercial)
X X X X
Automobile Parts and Accessory Sales
X X X
Automobile Rentals and Leasing
X X X X
Automobile Repair and/or Body Work (Excluding commercial wrecking,
dismantling, or storage of junk vehicles) Amended 12/01/2008
X S
Automobile Sales, New and Used
S X X
Automobile Service Station Operations
X X X
Bank, Savings and Loan Company and Other Financial Activities
X X S X
Barber or Beauty College Instruction
X X X
Bed and Breakfast Inns, Boarding and Rooming Houses
S X X
Boats and Accessories, Retail Sales and Service
S X X
Books and Printed Matter, Distribution
X X
Bowling Alley
X X X
Brewery, Distillery, Winery (Added 10/2/17)
S X X X S
Bus Repair and Storage Terminal Activities (Amended 12/1/2008)
X S
Bus Station Activities
S X X X
Jeffries v. Cty. of Harnett
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
November 27, 2017, Heard in the Court of Appeals; May 15, 2018, Filed
No. COA17-729
Reporter
259 N.C. App. 473 *; 817 S.E.2d 36 **; 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494 ***; 2018 WL 2206370
KENT JEFFRIES, Petitioner, and LYNWOOD HARE, FRANCES L. HARE, BOBBIE LEWIS
JEFFRIES, and THOMAS GLENN FINCH, Intervening Petitioners, v. COUNTY OF HARNETT,
Respondent, and DRAKE LANDING, LLC, WILLIAM DAN ANDREWS, and LINDA ANDREWS,
Intervening Respondents.
Subsequent History: Review denied by Jeffries v. Cty. of Harnett, 372 N.C. 297, 826 S.E.2d
710, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 424 (N.C., May 9, 2019)
Prior History: [***1] Harnett County, No. 11 CVS 1187.
Disposition: AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
Counsel: Troutman Sanders LLP, by Gavin B. Parsons, for petitioner-appellant and petitioner-
appellee Kent Jeffries, and for intervening-petitioner-appellants and intervening-petitioner-
appellees Lynwood Hare, Frances L. Hare, Bobbie Lewis Jefferies, and Thomas Glenn Finch.
No brief filed for respondent-appellee, Harnett County.
Bryant & Ivie, PLLC, by John Walter Bryant and Amber J. Ivie, for intervening-respondent-
appellees and intervening-respondent-appellants Drake Landing, LLC, William Dan Andrews,
and Linda Andrews.
Judges: ELMORE, Judge. Chief Judge McGEE concurs. Judge MURPHY concurs in result
only.
Opinion by: ELMORE
Opinion
[*474] [**38] Appeal by petitioners from order entered 10 March 2017 by Judge C. Winston
Gilchrist, and appeal by respondents from orders entered 17 March 2014 by Judge C. Winston
Gilchrist and 24 July 2012 by Judge Tanya T. Wallace, in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 27 November 2017.
ELMORE, Judge.
William Dan Andrews and Linda Andrews own and operate Drake Landing, LLC (collectively,
"intervening-respondents"), a recreational hunting and shooting enterprise operating in Harnett
County. William Dan Andrews is also [***2] the sole proprietor of Andrews Farms, a bona fide
commercial crop farm. Drake Landing operates a controlled hunting [*475] preserve and a
variety of other commercial shooting activities on several acres of property it leases from
Andrews Farms. Drake Landing has never obtained conditional-use permits to operate its
hunting preserve or the other shooting activities on the basis that these activities constituted
"agritourism" and were thus exempt from countywide zoning. Petitioner Kent Jeffries and
intervening-petitioners Frances L. Hare, Bobbie Lewis Jeffries, and Thomas Glenn Finch
(collectively, "petitioners") own residential property adjacent to or near Drake [**39] Landing.
This case arose from Jeffries' request that the local zoning authority determine whether thirteen
different shooting activities offered at Drake Landing constituted agritourism and were thus
exempt from countywide zoning, including a conditional-use permitting requirement. After
several hearings and hearings on remand before the Harnett County Board of Adjustment
("Board"), the superior court entered multiple orders on the matter, three of which are on appeal.
First, intervening-respondents appeal from a 2012 superior court [***3] order that remanded a
2011 Board decision with instructions to allow petitioners to present evidence to satisfy their
burden of establishing that Drake Landing's shooting activities were unrelated to Andrews
Farms' farming operations and were thus not shielded from zoning regulation under the statutory
farm exemption. On appeal, intervening-respondents assert the superior court misinterpreted
the zoning ordinance and our General Statutes by concluding that a nexus must exist between
the shooting activities and the farming operations, because the shooting activities constitute
agritourism and no such nexus is required for agritourism activities to be shielded by the farm
exemption from countywide zoning.
Second, intervening-respondents appeal from a 2014 superior court order that reversed in part a
2013 Board decision, in which the court concluded under its de novo interpretation of the
statutory farm exemption that shooting activities involving continental shooting towers, 3D
archery courses and ranges, sporting clays, skeet and trap ranges, rifle ranges, and pistol pits
were not as a matter of law activities intended by the legislature to be shielded from zoning
regulation, even when [***4] performed on bona fide farm property, and even when done in
preparation for the rural activity of hunting. The 2014 order also remanded the case to the Board
with instructions for it to issue adequate findings and conclusions to support its determination
that the remaining challenged activity—Drake Landing's operation of its controlled hunting
preserve for domestically raised game birds—constituted a zoning-exempt agritourism activity.
On appeal, intervening-respondents assert [*476] the superior court misinterpreted our General
Statutes by concluding these other shooting activities were not "agriculture" in the form of
"agritourism" but, instead, were "nonfarm purposes" as a matter of law, and were thus subject to
zoning regulation.
Third, petitioners appeal from a 2017 superior court order that affirmed a 2016 Board decision
entered on remand from the 2014 order. In its 2016 decision, the Board determined that Drake
Landing's operation of its hunting preserve was shielded from zoning under the statutory farm
exemption. In its 2017 order, the superior court acknowledged that intervening-respondents filed
the only petition for certiorari review of the 2016 Board decision, and that intervening-
respondents [***5] conceded they raised no issue with that decision. The order also indicated
the superior court judge refused to consider petitioners' challenges to the Board's 2016 decision
259 N.C. App. 473,*474;817 S.E.2d 36,**38;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***1
because they failed to timely perfect an appeal from, or to raise any written objections to, the
Board's decision as required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393. The superior court thus affirmed
the 2016 Board decision. On appeal, petitioners assert the superior court misinterpreted our
General Statutes by not concluding that operating a controlled hunting preserve is excluded
from the definition of "agritourism" because it amounts to a "nonfarm purpose" as a matter of law
and is thus subject to countywide zoning. Petitioners contend, alternatively, that even if
operating a controlled hunting preserve is not precluded as a matter of law from the definition of
"agritourism," the Board's determination that Drake Landing's particular controlled hunting
preserve operation is zoning-exempt was not supported by substantial, competent evidence in
the whole record and was thus arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners also contend the superior
court erred by failing to adequately review the merits of the Board's 2016 decision, since it
refused to address [***6] their challenges to that decision.
After careful review, we affirm the 2014 and 2017 orders. We dismiss intervening-respondents'
challenges to the 2012 order because they failed to include in the appellate [**40] record the
Harnett County Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), upon which they primarily rely to
challenge that order, and because our dispositions of petitioners' appeal from the 2017 order
and of intervening-respondents' appeal from the 2014 order renders moot any remaining
challenges to the 2012 order.
I. Background
William Dan Andrews is the sole proprietor of Andrews Farms, an undisputed bona fide farm.
Andrews Farms owns over 2,000 acres of property and its agricultural operation currently
consists of harvesting [*477] and producing crops, including, inter alia, tobacco, pine straw,
soybeans, timber, and grain sorghum. Since the 1990s, a tract of around 240 acres of Andrews
Farms' property has been licensed as a controlled hunting preserve, and fowl such as
pheasants and chukars have been domestically raised on the property for hunting purposes.
Around 2005, William Dan Andrews and his wife, Linda Andrews, established Drake Landing, a
recreational hunting and shooting enterprise that [***7] operates on leased property from
Andrews Farms. Drake Landing began its business by taking over the hunting preserve
operation. Over time, however, Drake Landing added clay target throwers and other parts of the
range to offer its patrons additional shooting activities beyond that of the early morning duck
hunts and the afternoon pheasant, chukar, and quail hunts. According to the Board's
unchallenged finding on the matter, Drake Landing uses over 2,000 acres of Andrews Farms'
property to operate its hunting preserve but only about 100 to 120 acres to operate the other
shooting activities.
In November 2010, petitioner Kent Jeffries, an adjacent property owner and the president of the
North Harnett Property Rights Association, Inc. ("Property Rights Assoc."), wrote the Harnett
County Planning Department to inquire as to whether the following shooting activities offered at
Drake Landing constituted "agritourism" and were thus exempt from countywide zoning: (1)
"hunting preserves"; (2) " 'continental tower shoots' for pheasant"; (3) "3-D archery courses and
archery shooting ranges"; (4) "sporting clays and sporting clay courses"; (5) "skeet and trap
ranges and other shotgun shooting stations"; [***8] (6) "pistol shooting pits and pistol shooting
259 N.C. App. 473,*476;817 S.E.2d 36,**39;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***5
ranges"; (7) "rifle shooting ranges"; (8) "concealed carry handgun training"; (9) " 'Three Gun'
firearms competitions"; (10) "IDPA (International Defensive Pistol Association) competitions,
both sanctioned and non-sanctioned"; (11) "shotgun competitions, both sanctioned and non-
sanctioned"; (12) "other forms of firearms competitions"; and (13) "corporate events hosted on
an agritourism farm . . . ."
On 18 January 2011, the zoning authority responded by letter in which it concluded (1) hunting
preserves constitute agritourism; (2) continental tower shoots and (3) 3D archery courses and
ranges, as "activities related to . . . methods and weapons customarily used in the act of hunting
in North Carolina," constituted agritourism; (4) sporting clays, (5) trap ranges, and (6) shotgun
shooting stations constitute agritourism "when used 'in preparation for the hunt'"; (7) pistol pits
and (8) rifle ranges, when "used to educate, enhance or assist in marksmanship skills for the
purpose of hunting in a traditional manner . . . would be considered a related use to the
agritourism activity" because those training activities [*478] were "considered 'preparing [***9]
for the hunt'"; and (9) corporate events involving these agritourism activities were similarly
zoning-exempt. However, the zoning authority concluded, "concealed carry handgun courses,
firearms competitions such as three gun and IDPA," and "tactical type training [were] not viewed
as a form of agritourism."
Jeffries, individually and as president of the Property Rights Assoc., appealed the zoning
authority's determinations to the Harnett County Board of Adjustment ("Board"). After a hearing,
the Board entered an order on 9 May 2011 upholding the zoning authority's agritourism
conclusions as to each activity on the basis that petitioners failed to show reversible error in the
zoning authority's decision ("2011 Board Decision").
On 10 October 2011, Jeffries filed a petition in the superior court for certiorari review of the 2011
Board Decision. He argued in relevant part that he was prevented at the Board hearing from
presenting evidence to [**41] establish that there was no nexus between Drake Landing's
shooting activities and Andrews Farms' farming operations. Later, Drake Landing, William Dan
Andrews, and Linda Andrews were allowed to intervene in the case. After the certiorari review
hearing, [***10] the superior court entered an order on 24 July 2012 remanding the matter to the
Board ("2012 Order"). In its 2012 Order, the superior court concluded that petitioners "were
denied the opportunity to demonstrate facts consistent with their appeal to the Board of
Adjustment" and thus remanded the 2011 Board Decision and instructed the Board "to
determine for each activity from which Petitioners appealed whether Petitioners can
demonstrate the requisite lack of connectivity between the shooting activities and farming
activities on the premises of Drake Landing" and to allow petitioners "concerning each disputed
activity, to offer evidence concerning the scope, size, hours of operation, number of persons
involved, traffic, etc. and relation to shooting activities and farming activities as well as
enterprise."
After the ordered remand hearing, the Board issued a decision on 11 March 2013, again
upholding the zoning authority's agritourism conclusions ("2013 Board Decision"). In its 2013
Board Decision, the Board concluded that (1) "[h]unting preserves are agritourism" and
concluded further that, "as used in preparation for the hunt," so were the following activities: (2)
"Continental Tower [***11] shoots," (3) "3D Archery courses and ranges," (4) "Sporting Clays,"
(5) "Skeet and Trap shooting and ranges," (6) "Rifle Ranges," and (7) "Pistol Pits." The Board
259 N.C. App. 473,*477;817 S.E.2d 36,**40;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***8
also concluded that (8) "Corporate Events" constituted agritourism "when used with hunting
preserves or farming activities."
[*479] On 10 April 2013, Jeffries petitioned the superior court for certiorari review of the 2013
Board Decision. Later, adjacent residential property owners Bobbie Lewis Jeffries, Lynwood W.
Hare, Frances L. Hare, and Thomas Glenn Finch were allowed to intervene in the case. After
the certiorari review hearing, the superior court reversed in part and remanded in part the 2013
Board Decision by order entered 17 March 2014 ("2014 Order").
In its 2014 Order, the superior court remanded the Board's determination as to the (1) hunting
preserve and reversed the Board's conclusions that (2) "continental shooting towers," (3) "3D
archery courses and ranges," (4) "sporting clay," (5) "skeet and trap ranges," (6) "rifle ranges,"
(7) "pistol pits," and (8) corporate events involving these shooting activities were shielded from
zoning regulation under the statutory farm exemption. Under a de novo review of the
farming [***12] exemption statutes, the superior court concluded as a matter of law that those
shooting activities were neither "agriculture" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-581.1 nor "bona fide
farm purposes" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340. Rather, the superior court concluded, those
activities were "non-farm purposes" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b), "even when
conducted on property which otherwise qualifies as a bona-fide farm or when conducted in
connection with or 'in preparation for' hunting" and were thus subject to zoning. It also
concluded, alternatively, that under the whole-record test, the Board's decision was not
supported by "substantial competent evidence in the whole record" because "[a]ll of the
competence evidence in the record establishes that the activities are in fact non-farm uses
which are subject to county zoning." However, the superior court remanded the matter in part
with instructions for the Board to issue "findings of fact and conclusions of law on [Drake
Landing's] operation of [its] 'hunting preserve.'"
On 4 April 2014, intervening-respondents filed notices of appeal from the 2012 and 2014
Orders. This Court subsequently allowed petitioners' motion to dismiss those appeals on the
basis that the orders were interlocutory. See Order, [***13] Jeffries v. Hare, No. 14-1022, 2015
N.C. App. LEXIS 1057 (N.C. App. Jan. 30, 2015) (dismissing appeals).
After remand from the 2014 Order, the Board issued a decision on 12 October 2015 in which it
concluded that, because Drake Landing possessed a valid controlled hunting preserve license
from the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, its property was thus categorically
exempt from zoning ("2015 Board Decision").
[**42] On 13 November 2015, intervening-respondents, not petitioners, petitioned the superior
court for certiorari review of the 2015 Board [*480] Decision. In its petition, intervening-
respondents conceded they raised no issue with the 2015 Board Decision and requested relief
in the form affirming that decision so they could refile their appeals from the 2012 and 2014
Orders. After a hearing, the superior court reversed the 2015 Board Decision by order entered 2
June 2016 ("2016 Order"). In its 2016 Order, the superior court concluded that possessing a
controlled hunting preserve license did not categorically exempt Drake Landing's property from
countywide zoning regulation, and it again remanded the matter with instructions for the Board
to issue findings and conclusions to "address the specific activities, if any, which [***14] the
259 N.C. App. 473,*478;817 S.E.2d 36,**41;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***11
Board finds to constitute a 'hunting preserve' and whether, and why, such activities are
'agritourism' within the meaning of the applicable North Carolina General Statutes."
After the ordered remand hearing, the Board issued a decision on 3 August 2016 with detailed
findings and conclusions supporting its determination that Drake Landing's particular controlled
hunting preserve operation was exempt from zoning ("2016 Board Decision"). In its 2016 Board
Decision, the Board concluded in relevant part that
controlled hunting preserves for domestically raised game birds, like those at Drake Landing
and Andrews Farms, are exempt from any and all Harnett County zoning ordinances[ ] . . .
because hunting preserves like those at Drake Landing and Andrews Farms are operated on
a bona fide farm, constitute a bona fide farm purpose under both N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-
340(b)(2) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-581.1, and are considered agritourism under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 99E-30.
On 1 September 2016, intervening-respondents, not petitioners, petitioned the superior court for
certiorari review of the 2016 Board Decision. In its petition, intervening-respondents again
conceded they raised no issue with the 2016 Board Decision and requested relief in the form of
affirming that decision, [***15] and again explained that they "intend[ed] to refile their appeal[s
from the 2012 and 2014 Orders], which was previously dismissed by the Court of Appeals as
interlocutory, and file[d] this Petition for Writ of Certiorari out of an abundance of caution in order
to preserve their right to appeal." Petitioners never filed a petition for certiorari review of the
2016 Board Decision, moved to intervene as "petitioners" to intervening-respondents' petition,
nor filed any responsive pleading in which they lodged any objections or requested any relief
from that decision; rather, the first objection petitioners raised to the 2016 Board Decision
occurred at the certiorari review hearing initiated [*481] by intervening-respondents' petition.
After the hearing, the superior court affirmed the 2016 Board Decision by order entered 10
March 2017 ("2017 Order").
In its 2017 Order, the superior court indicated that it refused to address the merits of any
challenge to the 2016 Board Decision raised by petitioners for the first time at the certiorari
review hearing. The superior court concluded that petitioners failed to timely preserve their
objection to that decision because they failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(c)'s
requirement [***16] of filing a petition for certiorari review, in which petitioners were required to
state the grounds upon which they contended the Board erred and to state the relief they sought
from the 2016 Board Decision, and because petitioners failed to file any "form of written
objection or request from relief" from that decision. The superior court also acknowledged that
intervening-respondents stated in their petition they raised no issue with the 2016 Board
Decision and sought relief in the form of affirming that decision "solely to preserve their appellate
rights with respect to prior rulings of the Superior Court." Accordingly, the superior court
concluded that intervening-respondents were entitled as a matter of law to prevail on the issues
properly before it and thus affirmed the 2016 Board Decision.
Intervening-respondents appeal the 2012 and 2014 Orders; petitioners appeal the 2017 Order.
II. Review Standards
259 N.C. App. 473,*480;817 S.E.2d 36,**42;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***14
On certiorari review of a county zoning board of adjustment's quasi-judicial decision, "the
superior court sits as an appellate [**43] court," Bailey & Assocs., Inc. v. Wilmington Bd. of
Adjustment, 202 N.C. App. 177, 189, 689 S.E.2d 576, 585 (2010) (citation and quotation marks
omitted), and is tasked with the following:
(1) review the record for errors of law; (2) ensure that procedures specified [***17] by law in
both statute and ordinance are followed; (3) ensure that appropriate due process rights of
the petitioner are protected, including the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
and inspect documents; (4) ensure that the decision is supported by competent, material,
and substantial evidence in the whole record; and (5) ensure that the decision is not arbitrary
and capricious.
Cary Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Cary, 207 N.C. App. 339, 341-42, 700 S.E.2d 80, 82-83
(2010) (citation omitted). The superior court should [*482] apply de novo review to a petitioner's
allegation of error implicating one of the first three enumerations and whole-record review to the
last two. See, e.g., Four Seasons Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 205 N.C.
App. 65, 75, 695 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2010) ("If a petitioner contends the Board's decision was
based on an error of law, 'de novo' review is proper. However, if the petitioner contends the
Board's decision was not supported by the evidence or was arbitrary and capricious, then the
reviewing court must apply the 'whole record' test." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
"We review a superior court's certiorari review of a [county] zoning board's quasi-judicial
decision to determine whether the superior court: (1) exercised the appropriate scope of review
and, if appropriate, (2) decide whether the court did so properly." NCJS, LLC v. City of Charlotte,
N.C. App. , , 803 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2017) (citation [***18] and internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. Petitioners' Appeal
On appeal from the 2017 Order, petitioners contend the superior court erred by affirming the
2016 Board Decision because (1) as a matter of law, operating a controlled hunting preserve
does not constitute the "bona fide farm purpose[ ]" of "agritourism" under the statutory farm
exemption but instead constitutes a "nonfarm purpose" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(1),
that is thus subject to countywide zoning regulation; or, alternatively, (2) even if a hunting
preserve is not excluded as a matter of law from the definition of agritourism, the Board's
decision was not supported by sufficient evidence in the whole record because petitioners
presented substantial, competent evidence that Drake Landing's hunting preserve is wholly
unrelated to Andrews Farms' farming operations, and that the scale of Drake Landing's hunting
preserve operation is such that it amounts to a "nonfarm purpose" subject to zoning regulation.
Petitioners also argue (3) the superior court failed to adequately review the 2016 Board Decision
because its 2017 Order affirming that decision was based not on the merits of the 2016 Board
Decision but merely on procedural grounds.
As a threshold [***19] matter, intervening-respondents contend that petitioners failed to
preserve any objection to the 2016 Board Decision because they never filed a petition for
certiorari review of that decision, nor filed any responsive pleading in which they raised an issue
259 N.C. App. 473,*481;817 S.E.2d 36,**42;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***16
with, or requested any relief from, the 2016 Board Decision. Thus, intervening-respondents
argue, the superior court properly affirmed the 2016 Board Decision based upon the issues
properly before it. We agree.
[*483] In its 2017 Order, the superior court made the following unchallenged, and thus binding,
factual findings:
1. On September 1, 2016, Intervening Respondents . . . filed a "Petition for Writ of Certiorari"
from the [2016 Board Decision] finding the "hunting preserve" . . . to be agritourism and
exempt from county zoning.
2. In their petition, Intervening Respondents expressly stated that their petition was filed
solely to preserve their appellate rights with respect to prior rulings of the Superior Court.
Intervening Respondents further stated that they "did not appeal the most recent
determination of the Board of Adjustment" regarding their hunting preserve.
[**44] 3. Intervening Respondents' Petition did not in any way object to, or [***20] allege
any error in, the [2016 Board Decision].
4. Neither Petitioner Kent Jeffries nor any Intervening Petitioners filed a petition for writ of
certiorari from the [2016 Board Decision]. Jeffries and Intervening Petitioners have not filed
any written objection or request for relief from the [2016 Board Decision], nor have they
asserted in any writing filed with this court, by pleading or Correspondence, the grounds
upon which they contend any error was made nor requested any relief from the most recent
decision of the Board of Adjustment.
5. Mr. Jeffries and Intervening Petitioners did not file any Answer in response to the petition
of [intervening-respondents] and did not request any alternative relief.
6. Intervening Respondents objected at the February 21, 2017 hearing to the court
considering any contentions of error now made by Kent Jeffries or Intervening Petitioners
because such parties did not file any form of written objection.
7. North Carolina General Statute 160A-393(c), made applicable to county boards of
adjustment by N.C. General Statute 153A-349, provides:
An appeal in the nature of certiorari shall be initiated by filing with the superior court a
petition for writ of certiorari.
[*484] The petition shall:
(2) Set forth the grounds upon which the petitioner [***21] contends that an error was
made . . . .
(4) Set forth the relief the petitioner seeks.
(emphasis added)
8. Mr. Kent Jeffries and Intervening Petitioners have not complied with the requirements of
N.C. General Statute 160A-393 for timely preserving their objection to the [2016 Board
Decision] and for seeking relief from such order.
259 N.C. App. 473,*482;817 S.E.2d 36,**43;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***19
9. Drake Landing, LLC, William Dan Andrews and Linda Andrews are entitled, as a matter of
law, to prevail on the issues now before the court.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-393 (2017) governs appeals in the nature of certiorari. Upon issuing a
writ for certiorari review of a board decision, the superior court "shall hear and decide all issues
raised by the petition[,]" id. § 160A-393(j) (emphasis added), and "shall ensure that the rights of
petitioners have not been prejudiced[,]" id. § 160A-393(k)(1) (emphasis added). Following its
review, the superior court "may affirm the decision, reverse the decision and remand the case
with appropriate instructions, or remand the case for further proceedings." Id. § 160A-393(l).
Here, intervening-respondents filed the only petition for certiorari review of the 2016 Board
Decision in which they contended the Board made no error in its decision and sought relief in
the form of affirming that decision. Petitioners, contrarily, [***22] never filed a petition for
certiorari review of that decision and, consequently, never set forth any grounds upon which
they contended the Board erred, nor requested any relief from the 2016 Board Decision;
petitioners never moved to intervene as a "petitioner" for the certiorari review hearing on the
2016 Board Decision, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(h); nor did petitioners file any responsive
pleading in which they raised any objection to that decision, see id. § 160A-393(g) (permitting
but not requiring a party to file a responsive pleading). Indeed, although the 2016 Board
Decision was entered and mailed to petitioners on 3 August 2016, petitioners lodged no formal
objection to that decision until the 21 February 2017 certiorari review hearing initiated solely by
intervening-respondents' petition.
Accordingly, because the only petition for certiorari review of the 2016 Board Decision was filed
by intervening-respondents, in which they [*485] conceded they raised no issue with that
decision and requested relief in the form of affirming that decision, and because petitioners
neither lodged any written objections to the 2016 Board Decision, requested any alternative form
of relief, nor moved to intervene as a "petitioner," the superior [***23] court properly determined
that the 2016 Board Decision did not prejudice the petitioning party's rights, and it thus did not
err [**45] by affirming the 2016 Board Decision based upon intervening-respondents' petition.
Further, although petitioners attempted to challenge the 2016 Board Decision for the first time at
the certiorari review hearing, the superior court properly refused to address the merits of their
arguments on procedural grounds.
"[A]n appeal is not a matter of absolute right, but the appellant must comply with the statutes
and rules of Court as to the time and manner of taking and perfecting his appeal." Hirschman v.
Chatham Cty., N.C. App. , , 792 S.E.2d 211, 216 (2016) (citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at , 792 S.E.2d at 213 (holding that the superior court properly dismissed
a petition for certiorari review of a board decision where the petitioner failed to name the
conditional-use permit applicant as a respondent as required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-
393(e) and thus failed to perfect his appeal, reasoning that this noncompliance deprived the
superior court of jurisdiction to review the merits of the board decision). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
160A-393, to perfect an appeal from a zoning board's decision, a party with standing must file a
petition in the superior court for certiorari review [***24] of that decision, which "shall[ ] . . . [s]et
forth the grounds upon which the petitioner contends that an error was made" and "[s]et forth the
relief the petitioner seeks." Id. §§ 160A-393(c)(1), (c)(4). "Our appellate courts have consistently
259 N.C. App. 473,*484;817 S.E.2d 36,**44;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***21
held that the use of the word 'shall' in a statute indicates what actions are required or
mandatory." Hirschman, N.C. App. at , 792 S.E.2d at 213; see also id. at , 792 S.E.2d at
213-16 (holding that a non-conditional-use-applicant seeking certiorari review of a board
decision never perfected an appeal because he failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-
393(e)'s requirement that such a petitioner "shall . . . name th[e] applicant as a respondent . . .
.").
Here, petitioners failed to comply with subsection 160A-393(c)'s petition filing requirements and
thus never perfected an appeal from the 2016 Board Decision. Further, petitioners never moved
to intervene as a "petitioner" to intervening-respondents' petition for certiorari review of the 2016
Board Decision, nor did they file any responsive pleading, raise any written objection, or request
any relief from that decision. Cf. Durham Cty. v. Addison, 262 N.C. 280, 283, 136 S.E.2d 600,
603 (1964) [*486] ("The decision of the Board of Adjustment is not subject to collateral attack."
(citation omitted)); Wil-Hol Corp. v. Marshall, 71 N.C. App. 611, 614, 322 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1984)
("[T]he statutory procedure for challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance [***25] is to petition
the Superior Court for certiorari to review the final decision of the Board of Adjustment. A zoning
ordinance may not be collaterally attacked by a party that failed to avail herself of the judicial
review that the ordinance and statutes authorize." (internal citation omitted)). Thus, the superior
court properly concluded that petitioners were procedurally barred from challenging the 2016
Board Decision for the first time at the certiorari review hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the 2017
Order affirming the 2016 Board Decision based on these procedural grounds and thus do not
reach the merits of petitioners' challenges to the 2016 Board Decision.
As a secondary matter, petitioners contend the procedural posture underlying the superior
court's certiorari merits-review of the 2015 Board Decision is identical to that of its certiorari
review of the 2016 Board Decision and, thus, the superior court should have similarly reviewed
the merits of that later decision. In both instances, petitioners argue, intervening-respondents
filed the only certiorari petition in which they set forth no allegations of error in the Board's
decisions and requested relief in the form of affirming [***26] those decisions for the purpose of
preserving their right to refile their appeals from the 2012 and 2014 Orders. Although the 2016
Order is not on appeal, we reject petitioners' argument. The postures yielding both certiorari
review hearings were procedurally different and, before the superior court's certiorari review of
the 2015 Board Decision, petitioners unequivocally expressed their intent to appeal that decision
and lodged specific, written objections to that decision.
The 2014 Order remanded the 2013 Board Decision, which yielded the 2015 Board Decision.
[**46] On 19 October 2015, respondent Harnett County wrote a letter to Judge Gilchrist, who
issued the 2014 Order, and enclosed a courtesy copy of the 2015 Board Decision. In its letter,
Harnett County wrote: "It is the belief of counsel and the parties that procedurally, the appeal of
the [2015 Board Decision] would lie in Harnett County Superior Court, but that Your Honor
would be under no obligation to judicially review [that decision] unless appeal is affirmatively
taken by any of the parties." On 26 October 2015, Jeffries responded by letter to Judge Gilchrist,
writing that Hartnett County "is an adverse party in this case and [***27] does not speak for the
petitioners" and that "[i]t is my position that an appeal is not necessary because this matter has
already been appealed." Jeffries opined that this Court, in dismissing intervening-respondents'
prior appeals, "labeled [the 2014 Order] as an [*487] 'interlocutory order' that 'did not decide all
259 N.C. App. 473,*485;817 S.E.2d 36,**45;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***24
issues before the trial court'" and, thus, "[t]his case is now back in Your Honor's court . . . ."
Jeffries then objected in writing to the Board's decision to "adopt[ ] wholesale the County's draft
order" and not allow petitioners to discuss or explain their proposed order, and then set forth five
separate grounds upon which he challenged the propriety of the 2015 Board Decision. Jeffries
also requested that Judge Gilchrist "set dates for the submission of written arguments and for
oral argument." Subsequently, on 13 November 2015, intervening-respondents filed their
petition for certiorari review of the 2015 Board Decision.
As reflected, although the certiorari reviews of both the 2015 and 2016 Board Decisions were
initiated solely by intervening-respondents' petition, unlike their failures to do so with the 2016
Board Decision, petitioners unambiguously expressed their intent [***28] to appeal the 2015
Board Decision and lodged specific, written objections to that decision before the hearing.
Accordingly, we reject petitioners' argument.
IV. Intervening-Respondents' Appeals
A. 2014 Order
On appeal from the 2014 Order, intervening-respondents assert the superior court erred by
reversing the 2013 Board Decision with respect to its conclusions that Drake Landing's
operation of commercial shooting activities involving "continental shooting towers, 3D archery
courses and ranges, sporting clay, skeet and trap ranges, rifle ranges and pistol pits" constituted
"agritourism" activities shielded by the statutory farm exemption from countywide zoning.
Intervening-respondents argue that the superior court (1) misinterpreted our General Statutes by
concluding as a matter of law that these shooting activities fall outside the farm exemption and
were thus subject to zoning; and (2) erroneously concluded that, in the alternative, the 2013
Board Decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence in the whole record.
Because we hold that the superior court properly concluded these shooting activities as a matter
of law fall outside the statutory farm exemption, we affirm [***29] the 2014 Order on this basis.
We thus need not address intervening-respondents' remaining challenge to the superior court's
alternative rationale for reversing the 2013 Board Decision.
In its 2014 Order, the superior court concluded in relevant part:
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be decided by application of a de
novo standard of review. Applying the de novo standard, the court concludes that [*488] the
General Assembly did not intend to include continental shooting towers, 3D archery courses
and ranges, sporting clay, skeet and trap ranges, rifle ranges and pistol pits within the
definition of "agriculture" in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-581.1 or of "bona fide farm purposes"
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340. These uses are instead non-farm purposes under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b) and are not exempt from county zoning laws, even when
conducted on property which otherwise qualifies as a bona-fide farm or when conducted in
connection with or 'in preparation for' hunting.
259 N.C. App. 473,*487;817 S.E.2d 36,**46;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***27
As reflected, the superior court properly identified de novo as the applicable review standard to
address issues of statutory interpretation. Our review is whether it properly applied that standard
by concluding these shooting activities do not as a matter of law constitute activities [***30]
intended to be shielded [**47] from zoning under the statutory farm exemption.
1. Statutory Farm Exemption from Countywide Zoning
"Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute."
Lanvale Properties, LLC v. Cty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 154, 731 S.E.2d 800, 809 (2012)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and
definite meaning. Id. at 154, 731 S.E.2d at 809-10 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Only
where statutory language is unclear or ambiguous may courts resort to canons of judicial
construction to interpret meaning.
Under the statutory farm exemption, "property used for bona fide farm purposes" is exempt from
countywide zoning regulation but "the use of farm property for nonfarm purposes" is not. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(1) (2013) (providing that countywide zoning "regulations may
affect property used for bona fide farm purposes," with the exception of swine farms, but
providing that "[t]his subsection does not limit regulation . . . with respect to the use of farm
property for nonfarm purposes");1 see also Hampton v. Cumberland Cty., N.C. App. , ,
[*489] 808 S.E.2d 763, 775 (2017) (noting that "non-farm uses, even on bona fide farms, are
not exempt from zoning regulation"). "[B]ona fide farm purposes include [***31] the production
and activities relating or incidental to the production of crops, grains, fruits, vegetables,
ornamental and flowering plants, dairy, livestock, poultry, and all other forms of agriculture, as
defined in G.S. 106-581.1." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
"Agriculture" is defined in relevant part as follows:
When performed on the farm, 'agriculture' . . . also include[s] the marketing and selling of
agricultural products, agritourism, the storage and use of materials for agricultural purposes,
packing, treating, processing, sorting, storage, and other activities performed to add value to
crops, livestock, and agricultural items produced on the farm, and similar activities incident
to the operation of a farm.
Id. § 106-581.1(6) (2013) (emphasis added).
However, neither Chapter 153A, governing county authority, nor Chapter 106, governing
agriculture, defined "agritourism." But Chapter 99E, governing special liability provisions, defined
"[a]gritourism activity" in relevant part as
1 Effective 12 July 2017, our General Assembly eliminated county authority to regulate swine farms by amending N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 153A-340(b)(1) to now provide that countywide zoning "regulations may not affect property used for bona fide farm purposes;
provided, however, that this subsection does not limit regulation . . . with respect to the use of farm property for nonfarm
purposes." See Act of July 12, 2017, ch. 108, sec. 9.(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws , (eliminating county authority to regulate
swine farms).
259 N.C. App. 473,*488;817 S.E.2d 36,**46;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***29
[a]ny activity carried out on a farm or ranch that allows members of the general public, for
recreational, entertainment, or educational purposes, to view or enjoy rural activities,
including farming, ranching, historic, cultural, [***32] harvest-your-own activities, or natural
activities and attractions.
Id. § 99E-30(1) (2013).
2. 2017 Act
While it was unclear when the Board and superior court decided the matter whether the
legislature intended to shield from countywide zoning regulation the same "agritourism activities"
it intended to shield from liability, after the case reached this Court, our General Assembly
enacted "An Act to Amend Certain Laws Governing Agricultural Matters" ("2017 Act"). See Act
of July 12, 2017, ch. 108, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws , . Most pertinent here, the 2017 Act
amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b) by adding subdivision (2a), which in relevant parts
incorporated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-30(1)'s "agritourism activity" definition into section 153A-340
and described certain types of zoning-exempt [*490] agritourism buildings and structures. Ch.
108, sec. 8.(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at (clarifying activities incident to the farm and
agritourism). As a result, the applicable statutory farm exemption provisions now provide in
pertinent part:
[**48] For purposes of this section, "agritourism" means any activity carried out on a farm or
ranch that allows members of the general public, for recreational, entertainment, or
educational purposes, to view or enjoy rural activities, including farming, ranching,
historic, [***33] cultural, harvest-your-own activities, or natural activities and attractions. A
building or structure used for agritourism includes any building or structure used for public or
private events, including, but not limited to, weddings, receptions, meetings, demonstrations
of farm activities, meals, and other events that are taking place on the farm because of its
farm or rural setting.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) (2017). A threshold question is whether N.C. Gen. Stat. §
153A-340(b)(2a) applies in this case to guide our interpretation of whether these shooting
activities were intended by the legislature to constitute agritourism activities shielded by the
statutory farm exemption.
An amendment that substantially alters the meaning of a law applies only prospectively. Ray v.
N.C. Dep't of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 9, 727 S.E.2d 675, 682 (2012) ("[T]he default rule provides
statutes with a prospective effective date[.]" (citation omitted)). But an amendment that merely
clarifies the meaning of a law, rather than alters its substance, "will apply to all claims pending or
brought before our State's courts after the amendment's passage." Id. We must therefore
determine whether the addition of subdivision (2a) clarifies or alters subsection (b). Id. at 9, 727
S.E.2d at 681-82 ("It is this Court's job to determine whether an amendment is clarifying or
altering." (citation omitted)).
"To [***34] determine whether the amendment clarifies the prior law or alters it requires a
careful comparison of the original and amended statutes." If the statute initially "fails
259 N.C. App. 473,*489;817 S.E.2d 36,**47;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***31
expressly to address a particular point" but addresses it after the amendment, "the
amendment is more likely to be clarifying than altering."
Id. at 10, 727 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting Ferrell v. Dep't of Transp., 334 N.C. 650, 659, 435 S.E.2d
309, 315 (1993)).
[*491] In Ferrell, our Supreme Court was presented with an issue requiring it to interpret a
statute governing the reconveyance of land taken by eminent domain but no longer needed,
which was amended while the appeal was pending, and addressed whether that amendment
was merely clarifying and thus applicable, or was substantially altering and thus inapplicable.
334 N.C. 650, 435 S.E.2d 309 (1993). There, when the Department of Transportation (DOT)
offered its initial sell-back price offer to the original property owner, the relevant statute did not
specify at what price the DOT was to sell back the property. Id. at 657, 435 S.E.2d at 314. But
by the time the case reached our Supreme Court, the legislature had amended that statute by
adding language that provided clear guidance on the sell-back price calculation. Id. at 658-59,
435 S.E.2d at 315. Our Supreme Court concluded that the amendment was clarifying, not
altering, and thus relied on its calculative guidance in [***35] determining the propriety of the
DOT's sell-back price offer. The Ferrell Court reasoned:
Since here the statute before amendment provided no express guidance as to selling price,
the amendment which addresses the selling price is best interpreted as clarifying the statute
as it existed before the amendment. It is, therefore, strong evidence of what the legislature
intended when it enacted the original statute.
Id. at 659, 435 S.E.2d at 315-16 (footnote omitted).
Here, when the Board and superior court issued their decisions, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)
exempted from zoning regulation property used for "bona fide farm purposes," which included
"all . . . forms of agriculture" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-581.1, such as "agritourism." But
neither statute defined "agritourism." However, after this case reached our Court, the legislature
amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b) by adding subdivision (2a), which incorporated
verbatim N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-30(1)'s "agritourism activity" definition into the section 153A-340
and provided guidance on what buildings or structures might constitute agritourism buildings or
structures, providing "strong evidence" that the General [**49] Assembly intended to shield
from zoning regulation the same agritourism activities it intended to shield from liability, and that
the amendment intended to clarify what sorts of activities it contemplated [***36] might
constitute agritourism.
Thus, we conclude that the addition of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) served merely to
clarify, rather than alter, the substance of the statutory farm exemption by providing further
guidance on what constitutes [*492] zoning-exempt agritourism activities. See ch. 108, sec.
8.(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at (labeling the heading of section 8(a), which added N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2), as "Clarify activities incident to the farm and agritourism" (original in all
caps)); see also Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N.C. 488, 497, 212 S.E.2d 381, 387 (1975) (" 'Whereas it is
logical to conclude that an amendment to an unambiguous statute indicates the intent to change
the law, no such inference arises when the legislature amends an ambiguous provision.' In such
case, the purpose of the variation may be 'to clarify that which was previously doubtful.'" (citation
259 N.C. App. 473,*490;817 S.E.2d 36,**48;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***34
omitted)). We therefore rely on the clarifying language of subdivision (2a) to guide our
interpretation of whether the legislature intended these shooting activities to constitute
"agritourism" activities shielded from zoning regulation under the statutory farm exemption.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a)
It is undisputed that Drake Landing operates its business on property it leases from Andrews
Farms, a bona fide farm. At issue is whether using bona fide farm property to operate
commercial shooting [***37] activities involving continental shooting towers, 3D archery courses
and ranges, sporting clay, skeet and trap ranges, rifle ranges and pistol pits constitutes
agritourism. As stated above, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) defines "agritourism" in
pertinent part as follows:
"[A]gritourism" means any activity carried out on a farm or ranch that allows members of the
general public, for recreational, entertainment, or educational purposes, to view or enjoy
rural activities, including farming, ranching, historic, cultural, harvest-your-own activities, or
natural activities and attractions.
Id. § 153A-340(b)(2a) (emphasis added).
Based on its plain language, it is unclear whether our legislature intended for these shooting
activities, even when relating to or incidental to a rural activity such as hunting, to constitute
zoning-exempt agritourism activities. Indeed, in the 2017 Act, the General Assembly requested
a Legislative Research Commission study pertaining to what constitutes agritourism. See ch.
108, sec. 1.(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws at (ordering the Agriculture and Forestry Awareness
Study Commission to study "[t]he type of activities that constitute agritourism when conducted
on a bona fide farm and other relevant matters relating [***38] to agritourism activities").
Accordingly, we turn to the canons of judicial construction.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a)'s use of "including" to introduce examples of acceptable
"rural" agritourism activities indicates the list [*493] is meant to be illustrative and not
exhaustive. The statute does not define "rural."
"[U]ndefined words are accorded their plain meaning so long as it is reasonable to do so." In
determining the plain meaning of undefined terms, "this Court has used 'standard, nonlegal
dictionaries' as a guide."
Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 258, 794 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2016)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also id. at 259, 794 S.E.2d at 792 (relying on the
New Oxford American Dictionary to define "building," "construction," and "contractor"). The
dictionary definition of "rural" is "in, relating to, or characteristic of the countryside rather than the
town." New Oxford American Dictionary 1531 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds. 3d
ed. 2010). As petitioners concede in their brief, "hunting is a traditional rural activity." Under
certain circumstances, activities incidental or relating to hunting that occur in, relate to, and are
characteristic of the countryside, which retain the spirit of the traditional hunting, may reasonably
fit within an example of a "rural" agritourism [***39] activity. Thus, for instance, operating a
controlled hunting preserve [**50] for domestically raised game birds which supports a bona
259 N.C. App. 473,*492;817 S.E.2d 36,**49;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***36
fide farm operation and allows the public "for recreational [or] entertainment purposes[ ] to . . .
enjoy [the] rural activit[y]" of traditional hunting may constitute agritourism. But the other
shooting activities at issue here do not fit so squarely into this interpretation.
Because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) lists examples of rural activities, we turn to
associative canons of construction. The interpretative canon of noscitur a sociis instructs that
"associated words explain and limit each other" and an ambiguous or vague term "may be made
clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found, and the meaning of the terms
which are associated with it." City of Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 279, 47 S.E. 457, 460
(1904) (citations omitted); see also State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 583, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860
(1944) ("Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments." (citation
omitted)). The interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius instructs that the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another. See, e.g., Fort v. Cty. of Cumberland,
218 N.C. App. 401, 407, 721 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2012) (citations omitted).
Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis to subdivision (2a)'s rural activity examples of "farming,
ranching, historic, cultural, [***40] harvest-your-own activities, or other natural activities and
attractions" imply that other contemplated rural agritourism activities should fit, in [*494] a
categorical sense, within this grouping. The listed examples associate in part because they
allow members of the non-rural public to view or enjoy traditional rural activities or attractions
relating to agriculture that typically occur in a rural setting. The activities listed also associate in
part because they are "natural," in that their performance preserves the land and does not
require its alteration other than by public consumption of natural items on the land. Cf. Friends of
Hatteras Island v. Coastal Res. Comm'n, 117 N.C. App. 556, 575, 452 S.E.2d 337, 349 (1995)
("Hunting, fishing, navigation and recreation require only a temporary presence on the Reserve
and do not necessitate alteration of the Reserve's undeveloped and natural state."). In applying
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, however, that subdivision (2a) explicitly lists
"farming" and "ranching" but not "hunting" implies that shooting activities, even when related to
hunting, were not contemplated as "agritourism."
Moreover, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) defines "[a] building or structure used for
agritourism" in relevant part as
any building or structure used for public or private events, [***41] including, but not limited
to, weddings, receptions, meetings, demonstrations of farm activities, meals, and other
events that are taking place on the farm because of its farm or rural setting.
Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, the illustrative examples of agritourism buildings or
structures include those used for "weddings, receptions, meetings, demonstrations of farm
activities, [and] meals," events which share no commonality with hunting or shooting activities.
Further, the inclusive phrase tying these examples together—"and other events that are taking
place on the farm because of its farm and rural setting"—indicates the legislature did not
contemplate buildings or structures used for shooting activities to be zoning-exempt agritourism
buildings or structures. While shooting activities might require the land space that only a rural
setting can provide, unlike the other event examples, they are not purposefully performed on a
farm for the aesthetic value of the farm or its rural setting.
259 N.C. App. 473,*493;817 S.E.2d 36,**50;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***39
"Where legislative intent is not readily apparent from the act, it is appropriate to look at various
related statutes in pari materia so as to determine and effectuate the legislative [***42] intent."
Craig v. Cty. of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 46, 565 S.E.2d 172, 176-77 (2002) (citation omitted).
Further, "words and phrases of a statute may not be interpreted out of context, but must be
interpreted as a composite whole so as to harmonize [*495] with other statutory provisions and
effectuate legislative intent, while avoiding absurd or illogical interpretations[.]" Fort, 218 N.C.
App. at 407, 721 S.E.2d at 355 (citations and quotations marks omitted).
[**51] That N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-30(1)'s "agritourism activity" definition was incorporated into
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) indicates the legislature intended to shield the same
agritourism activities from countywide zoning that it intended to shield from liability. Thus, we
turn to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-30(3)'s explanation of inherent risks of agritourism activity for
further guidance, which provides in part:
(3) Inherent risks of agritourism activity. — Those dangers or conditions that are an integral
part of an agritourism activity including certain hazards, including surface and subsurface
conditions, natural conditions of land, vegetation, and waters, the behavior of wild or
domestic animals, and ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily used in
farming and ranching operations.
Id. § 99E-30(3) (2017) (emphasis added). That this provision lists as examples of inherent risks
of agritourism activity "surface and subsurface conditions, [***43] natural conditions of land,
vegetation, and waters, [and] the behavior of wild or domestic animals," relatively minor and
rarer risks than those associated with shooting guns that would be integral to the shooting
activities at issue here, supports our interpretation that such activities were not contemplated as
"agritourism." Further, that the statute lists "ordinary dangers of . . . equipment ordinarily used in
farming and ranching operations" but not equipment such as guns used in hunting operations,
buttresses an interpretation that shooting activities, even when done "in preparation for the
hunt," were not contemplated as "agritourism."
In summary, commercial shooting activities involving continental shooting towers, 3D archery
courses and ranges, sporting clays, skeet and trap ranges, rifle ranges, and pistol pits neither fit
as squarely within traditional notions of hunting, the definition of a "rural" activity, nor the
category of a "natural" activity. Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
153A-340(b)(2a), shooting activities that require the construction and use of artificial structures
and the alteration of natural land, such as clearing farm property to operate gun ranges,
share [***44] little resemblance to the listed rural agritourism activity examples or the same
spirit of preservation or traditionalism. Applying that same principle to subdivision (2a)'s
examples of agritourism events yields the same interpretation. Under the principle of expressio
unius est exclusio [*496] alterius as applied to both N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(b)(2a) and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-30(3), that these statutes list "farming" and "ranching" but not "hunting"
implies that these shooting activities, even when done in preparation for a rural activity like
traditional hunting, were not contemplated as "agritourism." Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-
30(3)'s illustrative list of inherent risks of agritourism activities omits the typically greater risks of
shooting guns that would be an integral danger to operating these commercial gun shooting
activities.
259 N.C. App. 473,*494;817 S.E.2d 36,**50;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***41
Accordingly, after our de novo review of the statutory farm exemption provisions, we agree with
the superior court that commercial shooting activities involving the operation of continental
shooting towers, 3D archery courses and ranges, sporting clay, skeet and trap ranges, rifle
ranges, and pistol pits, even when performed on a bona fide farm, and even when done in
preparation for the hunt, were not contemplated by our legislature as types of
"agritourism" [***45] activities intended to be shielded from countywide zoning under the
statutory farm exemption. We thus hold that these shooting activities do not constitute
"agritourism" as a matter of law and are subject to zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the 2014 Order
on this basis. In light of our decision, we need not address intervening-respondents' remaining
challenge to the 2014 Order. Intervening-respondents, of course, may freely apply for
conditional-use permits to continue operating these activities, but we hold that they do not
constitute "agritourism" as a matter of law under our General Statutes.
B. 2012 Order
On appeal from the 2012 Order, intervening-respondents assert the superior court erred by
remanding the 2011 Board Decision on the basis that (1) petitioners failed to meet their burden
of presenting competent, substantial, and material evidence [**52] in support of their appeal to
the Board of Adjustment; (2) the superior court erroneously concluded that petitioners had not
been given an opportunity to be heard; and (3) the superior court misinterpreted the plain
language of the Harnett County Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) and our General
Statutes by concluding that there must be [***46] a nexus between agritourism activities offered
on a bona fide farm and its farming operations in order to be shielded by the farm exemption.
The linchpin holding together each alleged error is the superior court's conclusion that
petitioners burden to support their appeal from the 2011 Board Decision was to present
evidence "to establish that there was no requisite nexus between the Respondents' farming
activities[ ] and shooting activities." Intervening-respondents contend [*497] that, because the
shooting activities constitute "agritourism," no such nexus is required under the plain language
of the UDO and our General Statutes. According to intervening-respondents, the UDO provides
that "zoning provisions . . . shall not apply to bona fide farms, as defined herein" and that the
"use of any bona fide farm property for any non-farm use purposes shall be subject to the
regulations of the Ordinance, with the exception of those uses determined to be agritourism, as
defined by this Ordinance." (Emphasis added.) Thus, intervening-respondents continue, the
superior court erred by finding that Drake Landing operates "on real property of Andrews Farms"
and that "Andrews Farms is a bona fide farm pursuant [***47] to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340"
but nonetheless remanding the matter to the Board with instructions to allow petitioners to
present evidence that there was no connectivity between Drake Landing's shooting activities
and Andrews Farms' farming operations when no such nexus is required for agritourism
activities.
However, because intervening-respondents failed to include the UDO in the appellate record,
the authority upon which they primarily rely to support their main challenge to the 2012 Order,
these issues are not properly before us. See Town of Scotland Neck v. W. Sur. Co., 301 N.C.
331, 338, 271 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1980) ("No Town ordinance . . . was introduced, and we cannot
take judicial notice of one if it exists." (citation omitted)); Beau Rivage Homeowners Ass'n v. Billy
259 N.C. App. 473,*496;817 S.E.2d 36,**51;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***44
Earl, L.L.C., 163 N.C. App. 325, 327, 593 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2004) ("When no ordinance is
presented to the appellate court through the record on appeal, the appellate court is not
permitted to take judicial notice of the ordinance if it exists." (citation omitted)); see also Cty. of
Durham v. Roberts, 145 N.C. App. 665, 671, 551 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2001) (refusing to consider
appellant's zoning-ordinance-interpretation argument where, although the ordinance was
attached in an appendix to the appellate brief, it was not included in the appellate record:
"[E]xternal documents included in the appendix to defendant's brief are not considered here.").
Further, the practical effect of the 2012 Order was to [***48] remand the matter to the Board,
which yielded the 2013 Board Decision and, ultimately, the 2014 Order on appeal. Because we
have already determined that the superior court in its 2014 Order properly concluded that the
challenged shooting activities do not constitute "agritourism" as a matter of law, and because we
have already determined that the superior court in its 2017 Order properly affirmed the 2016
Board Decision that concluded the only remaining activity—Drake Landing's operation of its
controlled hunting preserve for domestically raised game birds—is exempt from countywide
zoning, and that petitioners are procedurally [*498] barred from objecting to that decision, no
shooting activities remain to be challenged. Accordingly, we dismiss intervening-respondents'
challenges to the 2012 Order on the grounds that they failed to include the UDO in the appellate
record and on the grounds that, in light of our dispositions of the 2014 and 2017 Orders, their
challenges to the 2012 Order are now moot.
V. Conclusion
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-393(j) and (k)(1), the superior court was only required to
address those issues raised by intervening-respondents' petition for certiorari review of the 2016
Board Decision and to ensure [***49] that intervening-respondents' rights were not prejudiced,
as petitioners never raised any written objection to that decision, [**53] requested any
alternative relief, or moved to intervene as a petitioner. The superior court also properly refused
to consider petitioners' objections to the 2016 Board Decision for the first time at the certiorari
hearing because petitioners were procedurally barred from challenging that decision by failing to
comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393's requirements. Accordingly, based on intervening-
respondents' petition for certiorari review, and on petitioners' failures to timely challenge that
decision, the superior court did not err by affirming the 2016 Board Decision. We thus affirm the
2017 Order.
Additionally, based on our de novo interpretation of applicable provisions of the statutory farm
exemption from countywide zoning, we hold that the particular outdoor shooting activities at
issue here do not constitute "agritourism" as a matter of law and are thus subject to zoning. We
therefore affirm the 2014 Order.
Finally, because intervening-respondents have failed to include in the appellate record the UDO
upon which they primarily rely to support their appeal from the 2012 Order, [***50] and because
our resolutions of petitioners' appeal from the 2017 Order and intervening-respondents' appeal
from the 2014 Order renders moot the issues they raised with respect to the 2012 Order, we
dismiss intervening-respondents challenges to the 2012 Order.
259 N.C. App. 473,*497;817 S.E.2d 36,**52;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***47
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
Chief Judge McGEE concurs.
Judge MURPHY concurs in result only.
End of Document
259 N.C. App. 473,*498;817 S.E.2d 36,**53;2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 494,***50
PERSON COUNTY
PERSON COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT BOARD MEETING
MINUTES
Person County Office Building, Room 215
March 17th, 2026, 7:00 PM
1. CALL TO ORDER/DETERMINATION OF A QUORUM
Chair Cynthia Lynch called the meeting to order at 7:00 PM and welcomed attendees. She
noted the meeting would follow a quasi-judicial format and that testimony would be limited
to competent, material, and substantial evidence regarding the appeal under consideration.
Roll Call - Conducted by Staff Michie Brandon. The following members were present:
• Bernhard Lampert
• David White
• James Thomasson
• Cynthia Lynch
• Hunt Fitzgerald
A quorum was declared.
3. CONFLICT OR INTEREST
No conflicts were declared.
4. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES
Chair Lynch and Member Thomasson noted a few minor typos for the 1/8/2026. Member
Thomasson made a motion to approve the minutes as amended and Member Fitzgerald seconded.
A vote was made and it passed 5:1.
5. REGULAR AGENDA DISCUSSION
Chair Lynch asked for an update from the Attorney on AP-01-2025’s appeal of the Boards
decision. The Attorney stated that based on his understanding the appeal of the Board’s decision
had been overturned and the court stated that it did not require a special use permit but would need
a non-residential permit. Staff Brandon stated that from her understanding it would be reviewed
administratively once the court order had been received.
The Planning Director presented the Board of Adjustment Training, focusing on answers to
specific questions provided by the Board members with the support of the County Attorney to
provide supplemental information to their questions.
The Board asked questions regarding the Planning Ordinance. The Attorney explained that
“Planning Ordinance” was being used as a general reference term for purposes of the case and
clarified that the applicable regulations are the Person County development regulations. Members
White and Thomasson inquired about the status of the County’s Planning Ordinance. Staff
reminded the Board that the County had considered adoption of a Unified Development Ordinance
the previous year; however, it was not approved by the Board of Commissioners. Staff further
advised that the County is currently working to consolidate all development regulations into the
Planning Ordinance.
The Board’s initial question concerned whether Board of Adjustment members are required to
consider claims that are unsupported by evidence or otherwise unproven. The Planning Director
emphasized the importance of members asking questions regarding the basis and reliability of
evidence and claims presented, including questions intended to verify the testimony,
qualifications, or documentation of expert witnesses.
A second question addressed whether Board members are required to consider assertions made
without supporting professional qualifications or documentation. The Planning Director again
emphasized the importance of questioning witnesses regarding their qualifications and carefully
reviewing submitted documentation.
Members also asked whether they have the authority to request supporting documentation or
clarification regarding unsubstantiated claims. The Planning Director explained that Board
members should ask questions and refrain from making statements until they are prepared to make
an informed decision. The Planning Director further noted that no new evidence may be introduced
after the hearing is closed; however, questions and answers may continue during deliberations.
Regarding evidentiary standards, members asked whether claims unsupported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence should be given evidentiary weight or stricken from the record.
The Planning Director explained that, as a quasi-judicial decision-making body, the Board may
look to Chapter 8C of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Rules of Evidence, including the
Rule 600 Series concerning testimony, as guidance, although strict adherence is not required. The
Planning Director further explained that the Chair may rule on objections or requests and may
consider whether testimony is irrelevant, repetitive, inflammatory, or hearsay.
When members asked about seeking clarification during an open public meeting, the Planning
Director explained that questions asked openly during the hearing do not constitute ex-parte
communications, particularly when directed at the presenting party during the proceeding.
Member Thomasson asked the Attorney and Planning Director whether statements made by an
applicant or their professional representatives must be verified and supported by evidence. The
attorney stated that the Board may require the applicant to provide any available evidence
necessary to substantiate such claims. The Planning Director noted that any supporting evidence
must be presented during the meeting or, alternatively, the hearing must be continued to a certain
date. The Planning Director further stated that the Board’s decision must be based solely on the
evidence and testimony presented at the meeting and entered into the record.
Member Thomasson asked if a claim is made in favor of the person making the claim, can the
Board require additional evidence. If the board feels that applicants or professional representatives
are misrepresenting facts, board must ask questions and get evidence into the record in favor or
against such claims. If they can provide it for the record that substantiates the claims, then the
Board must act on the evidence that makes it into the record whether you believe it or not. Good
evidence in the record must be the basis for the decision that the Board makes.
The Planning Director also provided a detailed explanation of standing in quasi-judicial
proceedings, including the rights of parties to present evidence, offer testimony, and conduct cross-
examination of witnesses. He explained the distinction between parties with automatic standing,
such as applicants and property owners directly involved in the case, and individuals asserting
special standing based on a demonstrated impact from the proposed action.
The Planning Director discussed the legal principles used to establish standing, including whether
an individual can show a direct, substantial, and legally recognizable interest that may be affected
by the Board’s decision. He further explained that Board members have the authority and
responsibility to determine whether a party has standing before allowing participation in the
evidentiary portion of the hearing. Guidance was also provided regarding the importance of
maintaining fairness and due process throughout the proceeding by ensuring that all parties with
standing are afforded an opportunity to present evidence and question witnesses.
In addition, the Planning Director presented a comprehensive overview of evidentiary standards
and testimony applicable to quasi-judicial hearings. He explained that evidence relied upon by the
Board should be competent, material, and substantial in nature. Competent evidence was described
as information that is reliable and admissible for consideration; material evidence as information
directly related to the facts at issue in the case; and substantial evidence as evidence of sufficient
quality and weight that a reasonable person could rely upon in making a decision.
The Planning Director further discussed the distinction between expert testimony and lay
testimony, explaining that expert witnesses may provide opinions within their area of professional
expertise when properly qualified, while lay witnesses are generally limited to testimony based on
personal observations and firsthand knowledge. Additional discussion addressed hearsay
evidence, including examples of hearsay statements and the limitations associated with relying
upon such testimony in quasi-judicial proceedings. The Planning Director noted that while hearsay
may sometimes be admitted into the record, the Board should carefully evaluate the reliability and
evidentiary weight of such information when deliberating and making findings of fact.
The Planning Director cautioned Board members that, in quasi-judicial proceedings, once an
applicant satisfies the applicable burden of production by presenting competent, material, and
substantial evidence demonstrating compliance with the required standards, the applicant is
presumed to be entitled to approval. He explained that this presumption exists because quasi-
judicial decisions must be based upon the evidence presented in the record rather than personal
opinion, speculation, or generalized concerns.
The Planning Director further explained that the burden shifts if opposing parties present
substantial, competent, and material evidence contradicting the applicant’s evidence or
demonstrating that the applicable standards have not been met. General objections, unsupported
opinions, or speculative statements are insufficient to overcome the applicant’s evidentiary
showing.
Instead, opponents must provide factual testimony, expert opinions, or properly authenticated
documentation that directly addresses the standards under consideration by the Board. Once
contrary evidence is introduced, the applicant is afforded the opportunity to present rebuttal
evidence of an equally competent, material, and substantial nature to address or refute the opposing
claims. They cannot add other new evidence or testimony that is not relevant to what the opposition
provided. The Planning Director emphasized that the Board must carefully weigh all evidence
entered into the record and base its findings and final decision on the preponderance and credibility
of the evidence presented during the hearing.
Planning Director concluded the presentation by reminding board members that their decision
must be made through Findings of Fact and conclusion of law for each standard for approval, and
same with denial. A denial may be reconsidered only if there is a material change in the applicable
standards or conditions. This was followed by specific questions by board members.
Member Thomasson presented a hypothetical example involving a major potato grower, as an
applicant, asserting that potato consumption does not stunt growth and citing the United States
Potato Growers Association as the expert source supporting that claim. Member Thomasson
expressed concern that such testimony could constitute a biased opinion and suggested that an
additional independent source should be required to substantiate the claim.
The Attorney responded that the existence of potential bias does not, in itself, render a claim untrue
or invalid. The Planning Director further explained that it is the Board’s responsibility to evaluate
whether sufficient competent, material, and substantial evidence has been presented to support the
claim or, alternatively, whether the hearing should be continued to allow the applicant to provide
additional evidence substantiating the assertion. The same is for any opposition to the claim.
The Planning Director emphasized that Board members may not independently support or oppose
a claim based on personal opinion or speculation. Rather, it is the responsibility of opposing parties
to challenge the evidence presented. The Board’s role is to weigh the evidence entered into the
record and determine whether it is sufficient to substantiate or refute the claim. The Planning
Director further noted that if the Board’s decision is based upon competent, material, and
substantial evidence and testimony contained within the record, the Board is less likely to commit
reversible error.
Chair Lynch asked whether the Board has the authority to subpoena individuals. The Attorney
stated that additional legal research would be necessary to determine the scope of the Board’s
authority in that regard.
Member Lampert asked how the Board should address matters involving highly technical subject
matter or specialized expertise beyond the education or experience of Board members. The
Attorney and Planning Director explained that when technical or specialized subject matter
expertise is required, the burden rests upon the applicant or opposing parties to present and explain
the evidence in a manner sufficient for the Board to understand and evaluate the information. They
further explained that Board decisions must be based upon the evidence and testimony presented
in the record rather than the personal education, professional background, or independent expertise
of individual Board members.
Board members expressed their appreciation for the presentation and the detailed responses
provided to their questions regarding quasi-judicial procedures, evidentiary standards, standing,
and decision-making responsibilities. Members noted that the discussion was informative and
beneficial in clarifying the legal and procedural obligations of the Board during quasi-judicial
hearings. Several members commented that the information would serve as a valuable resource
not only for current Board members, but also for future appointees and members of the public
seeking a better understanding of the quasi-judicial process.
Board members further recommended that the material be reformatted into a more accessible and
simplified version suitable for public distribution and orientation purposes. Members indicated
that providing simplified guidance documents and training resources could improve public
understanding of hearing procedures, evidentiary requirements, standards of testimony, and the
respective roles of applicants, opposing parties, staff, attorneys, and Board members during quasi-
judicial proceedings.
Staff acknowledged the recommendation and stated that efforts would be made to prepare a plain
language version of the presentation materials for public educational purposes and future Board
training sessions. Staff also noted that the material could be incorporated into onboarding and
continuing education resources for newly appointed Board members to promote consistency,
procedural fairness, and informed decision-making in future hearings.
ADJOURNMENT
Member Evans moved to adjourn. Member Lampert seconded.
Vote: Motion carried unanimously, 4–0. The meeting was adjourned at 7:20 p.m.
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Chair, Cynthia Lynch
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Recording Secretary, Michie Brandon
Planning Technician, Person County Planning and Zoning